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Note
Williams v. Pennsylvania: The Intolerable Image of
Judicial Bias
Lauren Keane*
In Williams v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court established a new
recusal rule, narrowly tailored to situations in which a judge previously
participated as a prosecutor in the same case. In keeping with the Court’s
decisions in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal and In re Murchison, the
Court correctly determined that such direct, prior involvement created
an impermissible appearance of judicial bias, such that a judge must
recuse himself or herself from the decision. Furthermore, the Court’s
recusal requirement is necessary in light of the ever-changing political
environment and the public’s growing distrust of the independence and
neutrality of the judiciary. As a result of Williams, the Court may find
itself turning inward to further examine its own recusal decisions,
requiring greater attention to circumstances in which the Justices may
have a personal connection to a case or controversy, such that it would
create the appearance or existence of actual judicial bias.
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INTRODUCTION
From the birth of the United States, due process has always been
understood to require a trial before an impartial decisionmaker.1 In the
Declaration of Independence, the Founders affirmed “that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness.”2 Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that no state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of the
law, nor deny a person equal protection of the laws.3
As a part of these protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, due process also guarantees an absence of bias on the part
of judges.4 Under the Due Process Clause, there is an impermissible risk
of bias when a judge had prior, significant, and personal involvement as
a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case.5 This
risk, therefore, necessitates the judge’s disqualification in those
instances.6 Stemming from English common law, the U.S. judicial
system further elaborates on the concept of personal involvement,
asserting that no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is
permitted to try cases in which he has an interest in the outcome.7 Due
1. Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 38
PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2011); see Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. 272, 276 (1855) (asserting that due process traces all the way back to the Magna Carta).
2. Serbulea, supra note 1, at 1110 (emphasizing that both the Declaration of Independence and
Constitution contain the phrases “life” and “liberty.” The Declaration of Independence cites these
as “unalienable rights[,]” while the Constitution declares that neither life nor liberty can be deprived
without “due process of the law.”). See generally The Declaration of Independence pmbl. (U.S.
1776) (stating that both “life” and “liberty” are unalienable rights).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. The due process clause guarantees due process of the law from
the states as well as the federal government. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause restricts the states in the same manner
in which the Fifth Amendment due process clauses restricts the federal government).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.”); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (asserting that
these Amendments’ explicit inclusion of “due process of law” reflects a commitment to an impartial
and fair judicial system, one that requires judges to “hold the balance nice, clear, and true”).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1; By the time the Framers drafted the Constitution, the idea that
judges should be impartial was already a well-recognized concept. Dating back as early as the
seventeenth century, English common law recognized that neutral judges were crucial to the fair
administration of justice, allowing disqualification in cases where judges had both a substantial and
a pecuniary interest. See Brief for The Constitutional Accountability Center as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 6, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (No. 15-5040)
[hereinafter “Brief for The Constitutional Accountability Center”]; see, e.g., Dr. Bonham’s Case,
77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1610); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609
(1947).
6. Brief for The Constitutional Accountability Center, supra note 5, at 6; see, e.g., Dr. Bonham’s
Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652; Frank, supra note 5, at 609.
7. In the seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of England’s Court of Common
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process thus entitles defendants to judicial proceedings in which they may
present their case with the promise that no member of the court is
predisposed to rule against them.8 Disqualification of a justice, judge, or
magistrate judge is required in any proceeding in which his or her
impartiality might be reasonably questioned.9 Judges are further required
by U.S. statutory rules to recuse themselves where they have a personal
bias concerning a party or personal knowledge of evidentiary facts in
question that concern the proceeding.10
It is out of this impartiality requirement and the necessity of absence
of bias, actual or perceived, that Williams v. Pennsylvania arose. In
Williams, the Court sought to answer whether a prosecutor who first
approved a capital-punishment charge could then, after becoming a
judge, adjudicate the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s own office
had engaged in misconduct in a subsequent civil proceeding.11 This case
raises two related questions: Did the Constitution require Chief Justice
Castille to recuse himself from the case? And, if so, what relief should be
granted to Williams?12 Relying upon prior precedent that effectively
Pleas, decreed that “no man shall be a judge in his own case,” where the phrase “own case” was
interpreted to mean a “direct financial interest.” Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652 (K.B.
1609) (holding that members of a board that determined physicians’ qualifications could not impose
fines and receive those fines); Serbulea, supra note 1, at 1113; see also Frank, supra note 5, at 610
(stating that Coke set standards for his time by putting forth the proposition that no man shall be a
judge in his own case).
8. One scholar noted:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge
to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him
to not hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the
latter due process of law.
Serbulea, supra note 1, at 1127 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
9. Id. at 1143.
10. Id. at 1121 (citing the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11, which provides that
reasons for disqualifying judges include personal knowledge of disputed facts within the
proceeding, or bias); id. at 1154 (citing the Connecticut Code of Judicial Conduct requiring that
judges recuse themselves in the case of bias, CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011)
(West, Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2011 legislation)); id. at 1158 (citing Iowa code that personal bias
is grounds for disqualification, IOWA CODE ANN. §602.1606 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg.
Sess.)); id. at 1159 (citing the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates recusal for
personal bias or for personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§26A.015(2)(a)–(e) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation)); id. at 1159 n.477 (citing the
Louisiana criminal statute, which includes bias or personal interest as grounds for disqualification,
State v. Brown, 874 So. 2d 318, 322 (La. Ct. App. 2004)); id. at 1161 (citing Michigan Court Rule
2.003, which lists personal bias and personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts as ground for
disqualification, MICH. CT. R. 2.003(C) (West, Westlaw through June 1, 2010 legislation)).
11. Richard M. Re, Argument preview: When must a prosecutor-turned-judge recuse from a
capital
case?,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Feb.
23,
2016,
6:47
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/argument-preview-when-must-a-prosecutor-turned-judgerecuse-from-a-capital-case/.
12. Id.
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established modern-day recusal law, the Court held that “where a judge
has had an earlier significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a
critical decision in the defendant’s case, the risk of actual bias in the
judicial proceeding rises to an unconstitutional level.”13 As a result, the
Court affirmed that due process entitled the defendant, Terrance
Williams, to “a proceeding in which he may present his case with
assurance” that no member of the court is “predisposed to find against
him.”14
Though both dissents argued that the significant lapse in time and the
difference between Williams’ earlier criminal proceedings and his current
civil complaint did not require recusal, the majority’s rule correctly
reflects the maxims most recently established in Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., Inc.15 Because both the appearance and the reality of impartial
justice are necessary to the public legitimacy of judicial pronouncements
and thus to the rule of law itself, Williams elevated a widespread state
recusal rule to constitutional status—an important step in the creation of
a new constitutional law of recusal.16
Part I of this Article provides an overview of federal and state statutory
requirements that guide judicial recusal procedures.17 Part I also outlines
the background pertaining to the development of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence regarding the Fourth Amendment and judicial recusal.18
Part II addresses the court’s decision in Williams v. Pennsylvania, as well
as both Justice Roberts’ and Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinions.19 Part
III analyzes the Court’s decision in the context of the Fourteenth
Amendment and against prior Supreme Court precedent, in addition to
providing an analysis of the potential for perceived bias as compared to
the risk of actual bias.20 Finally, Part IV discusses the impact the decision
will have on future judicial recusals and the potential issues that judges
13. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2016); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876–81 (2009) (discussing the current state of the Court’s recusal
rules).
14. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1910.
15. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886–87.
16. Richard M. Re, Opinion analysis: Another step toward constitutionalizing recusal
obligations,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
9,
2016,
2:20
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-another-step-toward-constitutionalizingrecusal-obligations/.
17. See generally infra Part I.A. (discussing the general statutory requirements both at the state
and federal level for mandatory judicial recusal).
18. See generally infra Part I.B. (explaining prior Supreme Court cases pertaining to judicial
recusal under the Fourteenth Amendment).
19. See infra Part II (discussing the case at issue in this Note).
20. See infra Part III (discussing why the majority opinion is in line with current Supreme Court
jurisprudence).
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and the Court may face.21
I. BACKGROUND
Protecting the reputation of the judiciary is the primary objective of the
laws governing judicial recusal in the United States.22 The need to foster
public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary, in order to protect
its reputation, motivated Congress in 1974 to enlarge and clarify the
standards for judicial disqualification law.23 Thus, judicial recusal is
governed by statutory provisions at both the state and the federal level.24
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has established a line of
precedent that aims to define an objective standard for governing the
recusal of judges in cases where the potential for or actual bias exists.
This Part will first cover the statutory provisions establishing the rules for
recusal and will then discuss the Court’s key cases that establish
precedent regarding when a judge must recuse himself or herself from the
bench.
A. Statutory Requirements for Recusal
Disqualification, or recusal, in the federal courts is governed by two
statutes: 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455.25 Section 144 allows litigants to
disqualify a district court judge by filing an affidavit in which they allege
facts that create a reasonable inference of bias or prejudice.26 However,
21. See infra Part IV (explaining the impact this decision will have on future Supreme Court
decisions and its corresponding social impact).
22. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial
Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 531 (2005); see also Christopher R. Carton, Disqualifying
Federal Judges for Bias: A Consideration of the Extrajudicial Bias Limitation for Disqualification
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2057, 2057 (1994) (asserting that “[i]t has long
been recognized that the success of the judiciary depends . . . on public confidence in the judicial
system”).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988); Carton, supra note 22, at 2057. Section 455 of the United States
Code, the general judicial disqualification provision, was amended in 1974. Act of Dec. 5, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-512, § 1, 88 Stat. 1609. The main purpose behind the section’s amendment was to
“broaden and clarify the grounds for judicial disqualification” and “to promote public confidence
in the impartiality of the judicial process.” H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6351, 6355.
24. See infra notes 25–41 (describing the federal and state statutory provisions governing
judicial recusal).
25. Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736, 737
(1973) [hereinafter “Disqualification of Judges”]; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1988). A third
provision also states that “[n]o judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case
or issue tried by him.” 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1988).
26. Disqualification of Judges, supra note 25, at 737–38; see also Carton, supra note 22, at
2058–59 (outlining how “Section 144 sets out the procedural requirements that must be complied
with by a party seeking recusal for bias or prejudice”). The statute governing judicial recusal states:
Whenever a party to a proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
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this portion of the statute applies only to district courts and does not
purport to establish general standards of judicial propriety. 27 Section 455,
in comparison, has a broader application.28 This section is directed at
judges generally and applies not only in the district courts, but also in the
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.29 Section 455 states:
[A]ny justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is
or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any
party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to
sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.30

Disqualification for state judges is determined pursuant to state statutes
or court rules.31 Currently, forty-five states and the District of Columbia
have adopted the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (“the Code”), either verbatim or in a substantially similar
format.32 Those remaining states that have not officially adopted the
Code have promulgated rules based upon standards similar to the Code
or are considering adopting the Code itself.33
The Code is similar to the federal judicial disqualification statutes, as
outlined in Sections 144 and 455.34 The Code states that “a judge shall
disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”35 The Code elaborates on
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is proceeding has a personal
bias or prejudice against him or in favor of the adverse party, such judge shall proceed
no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such a proceeding. The
affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists.
28 U.S.C. § 144.
27. Disqualification of Judges, supra note 25, at 738.
28. Id. Section 455, unlike Section 144, has no procedural requirements with which a party
alleging bias must comply. Instead, Section 455 is self-enforcing and mandates disqualification
whenever any of its provisions are violated. Carton, supra note 22, at 2065; see also 28 U.S.C. §
455(a) (noting that any judge must disqualify himself). Section (b) also supports the requirement
that the judge holds the primary responsibility for recusing himself. Id. at § 455(b).
29. Disqualification of Judges, supra note 25, at 738.
30. Id. at 738.
31. Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 29 (1994).
32. Id.; The Code was established in 1972 and revised in 1990 to create a single set of ethical
standards for judges and to preserve the overall honor of the judicial branch. See LESLIE W.
ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
3 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that the Code is designed to create a uniform set of ethical standards in
order to preserve the integrity of the judiciary); Serbulea, supra note 1, at 1122 (explaining that
state recusal law takes the form of constitutional provisions, court rules, and statutes).
33. Nugent, supra note 31, at 29. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON
2.11 (2007) (providing a list of instances in which a judge shall recuse himself or herself).
34. See Marie McManus Degnan, No Actual Bias Needed: The Intersection of Due Process and
Statutory Recusal, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 225, 228 (2010) (stating that “28 U.S.C. § 455 governs recusal
of federal judges and substantially incorporates the Model Code”) (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 29; see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2.11 (2007) (providing an
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circumstances in which judges must disqualify themselves.36 There are
four circumstances in which judges must recuse themselves from a
case.37 First, when a judge has a personal bias against a party or a party’s
attorney.38 Second, when a judge has actual knowledge of disputed facts
concerning the proceeding.39 Third, when a judge or any member of the
judge’s family living in the judge’s household has an economic interest
in the subject matter at-bar, or is a party to the proceeding, or has any
other more than de minimis interest that could be affected by the case.40
The fourth and final circumstance exists when the judge or the judge’s
spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of
them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) is a party to the proceeding in
some capacity (whether personally or as an agent for another); (ii) is
acting as an attorney in the case; (iii) is known by the judge to have a
more than minimal interest that could be materially affected by the case;
or (iv) the judge is aware that he or she is likely to be a material witness
in the case.41
In response to growing criticism over the subjective nature of Section
455, as well as the “duty to sit” rule, Congress adopted the American Bar
Association’s Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C, which was
subsequently codified with minor changes.42 Congress had three main
objectives in adopting Canon 3C: (1) to conform Section 455 to the ABA
Code; (2) to increase public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary
by establishing an objective standard, thus removing the subjectivity at
issue in the prior version of Section 455; and (3) to remove the “duty to
express list of circumstances in which a judge is required to recuse himself or herself).
36. Nugent, supra note 31, at 29. Without the presence of the circumstances expressly described
in the Code, it is less likely that courts would require judges to recuse themselves. To illustrate, if
a judge presided over a prior criminal proceeding and thus acquired knowledge of the facts of the
case, such as in Williams v. Pennsylvania, that judge must then recuse himself in a subsequent
proceeding involving one of the parties. State v. D’Ambrosio, 616 N.E.2d 909, 913–14 (Ohio
1993).
37. Nugent, supra note 31, at 29–30.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2.11 (2007) (listing instances in
which a judge must recuse himself or herself).
42. Carton, supra note 22, at 2068–69. In April 1973, the Judicial Conference of the United
States created the “Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges.” Code of Judicial Conduct
for United States Judges, 69 F.R.D. 273 (1975). The Code was founded upon the American Bar
Association’s “Code of Judicial Conduct.” Id. For a brief history of the Judicial Conference, see
Warren E. Burger, The Courts on Trial, 22 F.R.D. 71 (1958). See generally A Review of the
Activities of Judicial Conference Committees Concerned with Ethical Standards in the Federal
Judiciary, 1969-1976, 73 F.R.D. 247 (1976) (providing a survey of the efforts of Judicial
Conference committees that concern ethical standards).
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sit” rule.43 Currently, Section 455 and the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct
are nearly identical, as most courts apply an objective test when
determining if recusal is warranted, and the notion that judges have a duty
to sit has been abandoned.44
B. Supreme Court Decisions
Both the federal standards of judicial recusal and the Code aim to
create an objective standard mandating when judges should recuse
themselves.45 Similarly, the Supreme Court has, over time, also
established an objective standard regarding judicial recusal.46 In Tumey
v. Ohio,47 certain Ohio statutes provided that for those accused of
violating the state’s Prohibition Act, their trial would overseen by the
mayor of the village.48 Because of the mayor’s pecuniary and other
personal interests pertaining to the outcome of the trial, the Court was
faced with the question of whether this action deprived the accused of
due process, and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment.49
Tumey, the defendant in the case, was arrested and brought before the
mayor of the village of North College Hill and subsequently charged with
unlawfully possessing alcohol.50 Because of Ohio state statutes, in
addition to his regular salary, the mayor received or retained the amount
of his costs in each case he heard.51 The fees received by the mayor in
these cases, however, were only to be paid by the defendant if
convicted.52 The mayor could not receive this supplemental
43. Carton, supra note 22, at 2069–70. Congress stated in the legislative history accompanying
Section 455 that “the language . . . has the effect of removing the so-called ‘duty to sit’ and that
elimination of this ‘duty to sit’ would enhance public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial
system.” H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6351, 6355.
44. Carton, supra note 22, at 2070–71; see, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 139
n.360 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977) (acknowledging that there was a duty to
sit before Section 455 was amended, but determining that one of the stated reasons for the new
Section 455 was to abolish that duty).
45. Nugent, supra note 31, at 30.
46. See Degnan, supra note 34, at 244 (stating that the Supreme Court’s standard under
Caperton was objective in nature).
47. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
48. Id. at 514–15.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 515. Tumey was tried and convicted by the Mayor of the Village of North College
Hill, Ohio, under Ohio’s Prohibition Act. The statutes at issue allowed the mayor to collect $12 in
costs for himself and a $100 fine for the village on the condition that Tumey be convicted. Due to
this pecuniary interest, Tumey moved to disqualify the mayor, who ultimately denied that request.
Mark Andrew Grannis, Safeguarding the Litigant’s Constitutional Right to a Fair and Impartial
Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Campaign Contributions
from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REV. 382, 392 (1987).
51. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 519–20.
52. Id. at 520.
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compensation if he did not convict those brought before him.53
The Court held that this system could only be consistent with due
process if the fees typically imposed were small enough in size to be
considered de minimis.54 A procedure that offers a possible temptation to
a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant or
to fail to hold the balance “clear and true” between the state and the
accused denies the accused due process of law.55 As a result, the Court
held that the Due Process Clause incorporated the common-law rule that
“a judge must recuse himself when he has a ‘direct, personal, substantial
pecuniary interest’ in a case.”56 Therefore, the disqualification in Tumey
resulted both from the mayor’s direct pecuniary interest in the outcome
and his official motive.57
In re Murchison has long been cited as one of the pivotal cases in the
development of recusal law, as the Court built upon the objective standard
it established in Tumey.58 Murchison dealt with a Michigan statute that
authorized judges to act as a so-called “one-man grand jury,” in which
the judge could compel witnesses to appear before him in secret to testify
53. Id. Should the mayor convict the defendant before him, sums from the criminal fines were
then also deposited to the village’s general treasury fund for village improvements and repairs. See
id. at 521.
54. Id. at 531. Because the fees and costs were neither small nor negligible, the Court held that
it could not be found to be fair to each defendant brought before the mayor that the prospective of
such a large pecuniary loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. See id. at 532 (finding
that the process of convicting defendants was a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights and
deprived them of due process of law because the mayor had a financial interest in convicting
defendants brought before him); see also Brief for The Constitutional Accountability Center, supra
note 5, at 10 (noting that the Court considered a situation in which the judge had a financial interest,
though small in scope, in the outcome of the case because he would receive an addition to his salary
if he convicted the defendant).
55. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 531.
56. Id. at 523. In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, considered a companion case to Tumey, the
Court further elaborated the test established in Tumey. 409 U.S. 57 (1972). The Court held that the
financial system in place with respect to the case tried in the village was a due process violation
that created a possible temptation for bias, as established in Tumey. The Court asserted that the fact
that the mayor in Tumey personally profited from the fines procured did not itself establish the
limits of the principle the holding created. In fact, the Court in Ward established that the mayor’s
responsibility for the financial condition of the village created a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge to neglect the burden of proof required to convict the defendant because a conviction
would ultimately benefit the financial standing of the village. Marie McManus Degnan, No Actual
Bias Needed: The Intersection of Due Process and Statutory Recusal, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 225, 231
(2010).
57. Grannis, supra note 48, at 392. Either ground of disqualification would have been sufficient
by itself, as held in Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928). In Dugan, the Court upheld a conviction
and fine imposed by the mayor of Xenia, Ohio, stating that the mayor received a salary that is not
dependent on a conviction in a case, and that the mayor has “no executive, and exercises only
judicial, functions.” Id. at 63–65.
58. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).

190

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 49

about suspect crimes.59 In this case, the petitioners, Murchison and
White, were called as witnesses before a one-man, one-judge grand
jury.60 After questioning, both Murchison and White were tried in open
court by the same grand jury judge and were sentenced to contempt.61
Murchison and White objected to being tried by the same judge, arguing
that trial before the judge, who had brought forth the complaint against
the two men and had also both indicted and prosecuted their case, was a
denial of the fair and impartial trial required by the Due Process Clause.62
The Court, in rendering its decision, highlighted that a fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.63 To establish fairness,
there must be an absence of both actual bias and the probability of
unfairness in the trial of cases.64 As a result, the Court asserted that no
man can be a judge in his own case and no man is allowed to try cases in
which he has a personal or pecuniary interest in its outcome.65 Drawing
from the precedent established in Tumey, the Court further stated that
every procedure that offers even a possible temptation to the average man
as a judge to not be impartial is a denial of due process.66 While this rule
may bar a judge with no actual bias, in order to function properly courts
must have the appearance of justice.67 Thus, the Court held that it would
be improper for a judge to act as a grand jury and later try the very same
person accused as a result of the judge’s investigations.68 A fair trial is
59. Id. at 133.
60. Id. at 134.
61. Id. at 135. Murchison was interrogated at length during the judge’s secret hearing, during
which he was asked about suspected gambling in Detroit and bribery of policemen, as he himself
was a Detroit policeman. His responses to the judge’s questioning persuaded the judge that
Murchison had committed perjury. White also appeared as a witness before the same one-man
grand jury, during which the judge questioned him about gambling and bribery. White, however,
refused to answer, asserting that under Michigan law he was entitled to have counsel present with
him. As a result, the judge charged White with contempt and ordered him to appear and show cause
along with Murchison. Id. at 134.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 136. See also Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Disqualification of judge, justice
of the peace, or similar judicial officer for pecuniary interest in fines, forfeitures, or fees payable
by litigants, Art. I, 72 A.L.R.3d 375 (1976) (stating that due process of law, as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment and by comparable state constitutional provisions, requires that a party be
given a trial by an impartial body).
64. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
65. Id.; see also Frost, supra note 22, at 538–49 (stating that the rule that “[n]o man shall be a
judge in his own case” had been recognized in English law since at least the seventeenth century,
operating to disqualify judges from hearing only those cases in which they had a direct pecuniary
interest).
66. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
67. Id.; see also Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (holding that “[J]ustice must
satisfy the appearance of justice”).
68. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137.
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too important to a free and democratic system of governance to allow
prosecuting judges to also be trial judges over the charges they previously
levied.69
The Court continued to establish the relationship between the Due
Process Clause and judicial recusal in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,
a case that many consider a modern application of Tumey.70 In Aetna, a
justice on the Supreme Court of Alabama, Justice Embry, cast the
determining vote upholding a jury verdict against an insurance company
while simultaneously deciding another case pending against a different
insurer for the same legal issue.71 At the time Justice Embry wrote the
court’s opinion, in addition to having cast the deciding vote, he had a
similar bad-faith-refusal-to-pay lawsuit pending against Blue Cross in
another Alabama court.72 Because the decisions of the Alabama Supreme
Court are binding on all Alabama courts, Justice Embry’s opinion for the
Alabama Supreme Court had the effect of strengthening both the legal
status and the settlement value of his own case.73
As a result, the Court held that when Justice Embry rendered his
judgment, he acted as “a judge in his own case.”74 The Court further
underscored that its decision answered only the question of under what
circumstances the Constitution requires disqualification.75 The Court
69. Id.; see also Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality,
97 IOWA L. REV. 181, 183 (2011) (highlighting that the “notion of an impartial trial under the
direction of an unbiased, neutral judge is a central precept of our system of justice”); see generally
State v. Bradish, 70 N.W. 172, 172 (1897) (finding that judicial officers who had an interest in the
matter before them were disqualified from hearing the case).
70. 475 U.S. 813 (1986); Serbulea, supra note 1, at 1130.
71. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 816–17 (1986). In this case, Aetna Life
Insurance refused to pay Lavoie’s claim for health care expenses related to her hospital stay. Lavoie
subsequently filed suit against Aetna, demanding payment for health care expenses and punitive
damages for the tort of bad faith refusal to pay a valid claim. Lavoie was ultimately awarded $3.5
million in punitive damages against Aetna after her claims were remanded and brought in front of
a jury. Carlton Hilson, Note, Constitutional Law–Due Process Clause–Litigant’s Contributions to
Judge’s Election Campaign Required Judge’s Recusal. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.
Ct. 2252 (2009), 40 CUMB. L. REV. 607, 615 (2009–2010).
72. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 822. See Hilson, supra note 71, at 615 (noting that “[i]n a five to four
per curiam decision authored by Justice Embry, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s
punitive damages award”). Both of Justice Embry’s claims alleged bad faith failure to pay a claim
and made a demand for punitive damages. Additionally, Justice Embry’s claim against Blue CrossBlue Shield was a class action, whose class potentially included all justices of the Alabama
Supreme Court as members. Id.
73. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 823–24.
74. Id. at 824 (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 133); see, e.g., Serbulea, supra note 1, at 1130
(asserting that “the Court’s opinion did not decide whether the Alabama justice was actually biased;
it only considered whether there was a ‘possible temptation . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear
and true’”).
75. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 828.
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elaborated that the Due Process Clause creates the outer boundaries of
judicial disqualification; Congress and the states remain at liberty to
impose and create stricter standards for judicial disqualification as they
see fit.76
As new problems emerged, the Court continued to identify additional
instances which objectively require recusal.77 Until Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., Inc., there were only two areas in which due process
mandated disqualification: (1) where the judge had a direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest in the case, and (2) where the judge acted
as judge, jury, prosecutor, and complaining witness, and subsequently
adjudicated that same case in his or her judicial capacity only.78 In
Caperton,79 the Court was faced with the question of whether the Due
Process Clause was violated when a justice on the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia denied a recusal motion despite having
received campaign contributions from the board chairman and principal
officer of the corporation found liable for the damages.80 In August 2002,
the jury returned a verdict against A.T. Massey Coal Co. (“Massey”),
which Massey appealed.81
Massey’s chairman, Don Blankenship, decided to support Brent
Benjamin as a candidate to replace an existing justice on the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia after the verdict, but before the appeal;
Benjamin ultimately won.82 As a result, Caperton moved to disqualify
now-Justice Benjamin for lack of due process due to the appearance of
impartiality caused by the large amount of political contributions
Benjamin received from Blankenship.83 Justice Benjamin denied the
76. Id. at 823 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)). Consistent with the holding
in Tumey, the Court determined that not every question of judicial disqualification may involve a
constitutional question. Thus, matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, and remoteness of
interest may be left up to the discretion of the legislative branch. See Hilson, supra note 71, at 611.
The Court also held that the majority of issues pertaining to judicial disqualification do not rise to
a constitutional level. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 820 (quoting FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702
(1948)).
77. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 877 (2009).
78. Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the Aftermath of Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 247–48 (2010); Caperton, 556 U.S. at 890 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
79. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
80. Id. at 872.
81. Id. The Court awarded Caperton a total of $50 million in damages for fraudulent
misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious interference with contractual relations. Massey’s
appeal was filed after its post-trial motions challenging the verdict were denied. Id.
82. In total, Blankenship contributed $3 million to Justice McGraw’s campaign, more than the
total amount spent by all other Benjamin supporters; Benjamin ultimately won. Id. at 873.
83. Richard Gillespie, Note, Buying A Judicial Seat for Appeal: Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Company, Inc., is Right out of a John Grisham Novel, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
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motion, indicating that he found no objective information to indicate he
would be less than fair and impartial.84 After a rehearing resulting from
an additional request for recusal due to photos surfacing of another justice
on the court vacationing with Blankenship, the court again reversed the
jury verdict in a 3-to-2 decision.85
Expounding upon the principles established in Tumey, LaVoie, and
Murchison, the Court found a serious risk of actual bias where a person
with a personal stake in a case has a significant and disparate influence
in electing the judge presiding over the case, either by raising funds or by
overseeing the judge’s election campaign.86 The Court’s inquiry centered
around the contributions’ size relative to the total amount of money
contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and
the effect the contributions had on the outcome.87 The Court also took
into consideration the judicial reforms the state had implemented to
eliminate both actual partiality and the appearance of partiality,
highlighting that the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct requires a
judge to “disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”88 With these
standards in mind, in light of the totality of the circumstances presented
in the case, the Court found that Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse
himself violated the Due Process Clause and reversed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.89
309, 315 (2010). Caperton moved to disqualify now-Justice Benjamin under the Due Process
Clause and West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct based on the conflict caused by Blankenship’s
campaign donations. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873–74.
84. Following Justice Benjamin’s refusal to recuse himself, in November 2007, the court
reversed the $50 million verdict against Massey. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 874.
85. Massey also submitted a recusal motion based on Justice Starcher’s public criticism of
Blankenship’s role in the 2004 elections, a request which was granted by Justice Starcher. In his
recusal memorandum, Justice Starcher urged Justice Benjamin to also recuse himself, noting that
Blankenship’s friendship and bestowal of wealth had created a “cancer in the affairs of [this]
Court.” Id. at 875.
86. Id. at 884. See also Gillespie, supra note 83, at 333 (noting that the Due Process Clause had
previously not been applied to political contributions, as stated in both Chief Justice Roberts’ and
Justice Scalia’s dissents, because it is an area typically regulated at the state level or through
Congress).
87. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.
88. Id. at 888–89 (quoting W. Va. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1)); see also U.S.C. §
455(a) (stating that “[a]ny justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned”); see generally
Carol Morello, W. Va. Supreme Court Justice Defeated in Rancorous Contest, WASH. POST (Nov.
4, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23669-2004Nov3.html (during the
judicial campaign, Benjamin vowed to “recuse himself in cases involving Blankenship and his
company”).
89. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 890. A totality of the circumstances test considers all the
circumstances pertaining to the alleged violation, rather than specified elements. See BLACK’S LAW
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Despite the concern that the majority had created a rule both overbroad
in scope and poorly defined that would “do far more to erode public
confidence in judicial impartiality than an isolated failure to recuse in a
particular case,” the Court in Caperton highlighted the extreme and rare
circumstances under which the case was brought forth.90 Following the
decision, lower federal courts and state courts focused on the majority’s
“extreme facts” language when reviewing Caperton motions.91 As a
result, a litigant faces significant obstacles when challenging a judge’s
refusal to recuse himself or herself under the Caperton standard.92
II. DISCUSSION
On October 1, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Williams
v. Pennsylvania, an appeal from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
concerning judicial bias in a death penalty case. This Part will first
discuss the case’s factual background, then the majority’s decision and
the two dissenting opinions.
A. Factual Background
In 1984, Terrance Williams allegedly murdered fifty-six-year-old
Amos Norwood in Philadelphia.93 During the trial in state court, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania presented evidence that Williams and
his friend, Marc Draper, had been standing on a street corner when
Norwood drove by.94 The two requested a ride home from Norwood and
directed him to a cemetery instead of the boys’ homes.95 Once there,
“Williams and Draper tied Norwood in his own clothes and beat him to
DICTIONARY POCKET EDITION 726 (3d ed. 2006). Though some factors may occur more frequently
than others, the importance of a factor depends upon the particular facts of the case. Whether or not
a factor is present also does not determine the outcome of the test. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 890.
90. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 891 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Degnan, supra note 56, at 240. In his
dissent, Chief Justice Roberts noted that “[h]ard cases make bad law.” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 899
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, however, emphasizes that the relevant question is if the
Court does more good than harm by aiming to correct an imperfection previously created through
an expansion of the Court’s constitutional mandate. Id. at 903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Degnan, supra note 56, at 241.
92. Id.
93. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1903 (2016). Williams committed two
homicides in Philadelphia, the first as a seventeen-year-old and the second shortly after turning
eighteen. The same Assistant District Attorney prosecuted both cases. In the first case, at issue in
this Article, that prosecutor “aggressively sought a first degree murder conviction and imposition
of the death penalty.” Brief for Petitioner at 3–4, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016)
(No. 15-5040) [hereinafter “Brief for Petitioner”]. However, at that trial, the evidence established
that the victim had sexually abused Mr. Williams as a minor, and the jury returned a verdict of
third-degree murder. Id.
94. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1903.
95. Id.
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death.”96 During his testimony at trial, Draper intimated that robbery was
the motive for the crime.97 Williams took the stand on his own behalf and
asserted that he was neither involved in the crime, nor did he know the
victim.98
Also during trial, the prosecutor for the Commonwealth directly asked
for permission from her supervisors in the district attorney’s office to
pursue the death penalty as the desired punishment for Williams.99 In
support of her request, the prosecutor prepared a memorandum that set
forth the details of the crime, as well as information regarding two
statutory aggravating factors and mitigating facts.100 Then-district
attorney of Philadelphia, Ronald Castille, wrote “[a]pproved to proceed
on the death penalty” at the bottom of the document. 101 The prosecutor
argued that Williams should receive the death penalty because he killed
Norwood “for no other reason but that a kind man offered him a ride
home.”102
The jury found two aggravating circumstances—the murder was
committed during the course of a robbery and Williams had a significant
history of violent felony convictions—but no mitigating circumstances,
and sentenced Williams to death.103 Over the course of twenty-six years,
Williams’ conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal, state postconviction review, and federal habeas review.104 In 2012, Williams filed
a petition pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”).105 The petition was based on new information provided by
Draper, who told Williams’ counsel that he informed the Commonwealth
96. Id.
97. Id. Because the prosecutor had previously worked Williams’ first case, evidence following
the trial showed that she had in fact recognized the “obvious implication that [Williams’]
relationship with Amos Norwood was substantially similar to his relationship with [the first
victim].” However, discovery provided to the defense before trial omitted all evidence of
Norwood’s sexual abuse of minors. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 3–4.
98. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1903.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. As the District Attorney, Castille was responsible for managing the Commonwealth’s
criminal prosecutions and, in potential capital cases, making the final determination of whether the
Commonwealth would seek a death sentence. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 2.
102. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1903 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 7 (quoting the
prosecutor’s argument during trial that “Mr. Williams has taken two lives, two innocent lives of
persons who were older and perhaps unable certainly to defend themselves against the violence that
he inflicted upon them. He thought of no one but himself, and he had no reason to commit these
crimes”)).
103. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1903–04.
104. Id. at 1904.
105. Id.; see also Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §9541 et seq. (2007)
(describing the circumstances for a post-conviction appeal).
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in advance of trial that Williams had been in a sexual relationship with
Norwood and that relationship was the real motive behind Norwood’s
murder.106 Draper asserted that the Commonwealth instructed him to give
false testimony that Williams killed Norwood in order to rob him.107
The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas (“PCRA Court”) held an
evidentiary hearing based on Williams’ claims.108 During the hearing,
both Draper and the trial prosecutor testified regarding Williams’
allegations of false testimony and suppression of evidence.109 The PCRA
Court ordered the district attorney’s office to produce the undisclosed
prosecutor and police files.110 Based on these files and the evidentiary
hearing, the PCRA Court found that the trial prosecutor had suppressed
material and exculpatory evidence that violated the principals set forth in
Brady v. Maryland and engaged in “prosecutorial gamesmanship.”111
The PCRA Court stayed Williams’ execution and ordered a new
sentencing hearing.112
In response to the PCRA Court’s stay of execution, the
Commonwealth submitted an emergency application to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court—nearly three decades after Williams’ prosecution.113 As
a result of the disclosure of the trial prosecutor’s sentencing
memorandum during the PCRA proceedings, Williams was aware of
Chief Justice Castille’s involvement in the decision to seek the death
sentence in his state court trial.114 For this reason, Williams filed both a
response to the Commonwealth’s application and a motion asking Chief
Justice Castille to recuse himself or, should he decline to do so, to refer

106. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1904; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 2 (stating that
this new evidence supported Williams’ claim that the fifty-six-year-old victim had sexually abused
Williams and other underage teens).
107. Draper also revealed that the prosecutor had promised to write a letter on his behalf to the
state parole board in exchange for his testimony, a benefit he had previously not disclosed at trial.
Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1904.
108. Williams alleged in his petition that “the prosecutor had procured false testimony from
Draper and suppressed evidence regarding Norwood’s sexual relationship with Williams.” Id.
109. Id.
110. Included in these documents were the trial prosecutor’s sentencing memorandum,
inclusive of then-District Attorney Castille’s authorization to pursue to death penalty. Id.
111. Id. at 1904; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 95 (1963) (holding that a prosecutor’s
suppression of evidence violated the Due Process Clause). The Williams trial court further noted:
“Not only did [the trial prosecutor] keep these ‘issues’ from being presented to the empaneled jury,
but she also chose the jury with an eye towards weeding out jurors who might have been
sympathetic to victims of sexual impropriety.” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 15 n.6.
112. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1904.
113. At this point, Castille had since been elected to a seat of the State Supreme Court and was
currently serving as its Chief Justice. Id.
114. Id.
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the recusal motion to the full court for decision.115 “Without providing
any explanation, Chief Justice Castille denied the motion for recusal and
the request for its referral.”116 Just two days later, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied the application to vacate the stay and ordered the
parties to fully brief the issues raised in the appeal.117 Subsequently, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the PCRA Court’s order granting
relief for the penalty phase of the trial and reinstated the original death
sentence.118
In addition to joining the majority decision, Chief Justice Castille also
authored a concurrence in which he argued that the PCRA Court had “lost
sight of its role as a neutral judicial officer” and had stayed Williams’
execution for “no valid reason.”119 Chief Justice Castille further stated
that the court misapplied the substantive status of Brady law.120 Two
weeks after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision, Chief Justice
Castille retired from the bench.121 On October 1, 2015, the United States
Supreme Court granted Williams’ petition for certiorari.122 Williams
argued that Chief Justice Castille’s previous decision to pursue a death
sentence against him as a district attorney effectively precluded the chief
justice from presiding over Williams’ petition to overturn that
sentence.123 Williams also asserted that Castille violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by acting as both prosecutor and
judge in his case.124

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1904–05. Chief Justice Castille and Justices Baer and Stevens joined the majority
opinion written by Justice Eakin. Justices Saylor and Todd concurred, though they did not issue a
separate opinion. Id. at 1905. In its majority opinion, the court rejected Williams’ claims of
government interference and Brady violations on procedural grounds, asserting that Williams had
not previously discovered and developed the evidence himself, including the facts disclosed in the
files of the prosecutor and police. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 18.
119. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234, 1245 (Pa.
2014)).
120. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905. Chief Justice Castille also denounced what he termed as the
“obstructionist anti-death penalty agenda” of Williams’ counsel from the Federal Defender’s office.
He urged the PCRA courts to stay vigilant when it comes to activities of this particular advocacy
group, or else the Defender’s office could turn post-conviction proceedings into a circus, with
themselves as the proverbial ringmasters. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905 (quoting Williams, 105 A.3d
at 1247).
121. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905.
122. Id.; see Williams v. Pennsylvania, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/williams-v-pennsylvania/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (outlining the timing and procedural
stages for the case).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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B. Majority Decision
While the Court’s due process precedent did not set forth a specific test
governing recusal under the facts presented in Williams’ case, the
majority, led by Justice Kennedy, held that when a judge has prior
involvement in a case as the prosecutor, the principles established by the
Court in prior recusal decisions must apply.125 The Court held that under
the Due Process Clause, there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when
a judge had prior significant and personal involvement as a prosecutor in
a decisive decision pertaining to the defendant’s case.126
The Court explained that due process requires an absence of bias on
the part of the judge.127 Because bias is difficult to discern in oneself, the
Court’s prior holdings apply an objective standard that avoids having to
determine whether actual bias is present.128 In lieu of asking whether a
judge harbors a real, subjective bias, the Court looks to whether a judge
in that position is likely to be neutral or whether there is a potential for
bias.129 Relying on Murchison, the Court held that an unconstitutional
potential for bias exists when the same person serves as both the accuser
and the adjudicator in a case.130 This risk of bias is reflected in the idea
that no man can be a judge in his own case and cannot try cases in which
he has an interest in the outcome.131
This guarantee that no man can be a judge in his own case, according
125. Id. Though the Court had not specifically dealt with the factual circumstances of Williams
previously, the Court had identified a number of scenarios in which a judge’s involvement in a case
proved to create either the actual existence or the probability of bias such that it required recusal.
For more on the circumstances previously identified as impermissible bias, see supra Part I for a
discussion of prior precedent.
126. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905.
127. Id. at 190 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (finding that fairness
requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases and that our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness)).
128. This objective standard, according to Justice Kennedy, is necessary to establish an
enforceable and workable framework that the Court can apply in future circumstances. Williams,
136 S. Ct. at 1905.
129. Id. (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009) (noting that
the objective inquiry is “not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the
average judge in his position is likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential
for bias.”)); see generally Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971) (holding that the
Due Process Clause requires that a defendant receive a trial before a judge “other than the one
reviled by the contemnor”).
130. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905 (citing Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136–37 (asserting that “every
procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge not to hold the
balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the accused denies the latter due process of law”)
(quoting Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
131. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905–06 (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (“[N]o man can be
a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the
outcome.”)).
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to Justice Kennedy, would have no substance if it did not disqualify a
former prosecutor from sitting in judgment of a case in which he or she
made a critical decision.132 Again relying on Murchison, the Court held
that a judge cannot be wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal
of the accused after being a part of the accusatory process.133 According
to Justice Kennedy, no attorney is more integral to the process than a
prosecutor who participates in a major adversarial decision such as which
penalty to pursue in sentencing.134 When a judge has advocated for the
state in the same case that the judge is asked to adjudicate, a serious
question arises as to whether he or she can set aside personal interest in
the outcome of the case.135 Justice Kennedy argued that there is a risk
that the judge would be “psychologically wedded” to his or her previous
role as a prosecutor, and that he or she would attempt to avoid the
appearance of having erred or changed position.136 Additionally, the
judge’s own personal knowledge of the case may carry more weight than
the parties’ arguments to the court.137
The Commonwealth argued that Murchison does not create a rule that
due process requires disqualification of a judge who had significant
involvement in making a critical decision.138 Though the facts of
Murchison differ from those in Williams in many respects, as well as the
fact that Murchison’s holding did not explicitly apply to the given facts,
the Court nevertheless found that Murchison applied to the case-athand.139 Factual differences aside, the Court held that the principles
132. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1906.
133. Id. (citing Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137). Here the Court notes that the case involved a oneman judge-grand jury proceeding in which the judge called witnesses to testify about suspected
crimes. Id. The court in Murchison overturned this conviction “on the ground that the judge’s dual
position as accuser and decisionmaker in the contempt trials violated due process.” Id. See
Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137.
134. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1906.
135. Id. The Court makes a similar analysis to that in Murchison, in which the Court held that
a judge who has been a part of the accusatory process cannot be wholly disinterested in the
conviction or acquittal of those who have been accused. See Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137.
136. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1906 (finding that a judge “would consciously or unconsciously
avoid the appearance of having erred or changed [his or her] position”) (citing Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35, 57 (1975)).
137. The Court noted:
[T]he judge whom due process requires to be impartial in weighing the evidence
presented before him, called on his own personal knowledge and impression of what had
occurred in the grand jury room and his judgment was based in part on this impression,
the accuracy of which could not be tested by adequate cross-examination.
Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1906 (citing Murchison, 349 U.S. at 138).
138. Id.
139. Id. The Court distinguishes the facts presented in Murchison by noting they included a
single official who investigated suspected crimes, made the decision to charge witnesses,
subsequently heard evidence on the charges he brought forth, and finally issued judgments of
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explained in Murchison are applicable when a judge had a direct, personal
role in the defendant’s prosecution.140 Though the majority pointed out
the significant lapse of time between the original state court trial and the
current proceedings, it explained that the involvement of other actors and
the passage of time were simply consequences of a complex criminal
justice system in which a single case may be litigated through multiple
proceedings over a long period of time.141 The Court held that this only
heightens the need for objective rules to prevent the operation of bias that
could otherwise be concealed.142 Within this large adversarial system, a
single prosecutor may still have an influence that is nevertheless
significant, bearing the responsibility for any number of critical
decisions.143 Even if a significant period of time passes before the
prosecutor is once again involved in the matter, the case may implicate
the effects of his or her original decision.144 In such circumstances,
Justice Kennedy argued, there remains a serious risk that a judge would
be influenced by an improper, even if inadvertent, motive to both validate
and preserve the result previously obtained.145 According to the Court,
having a number of different parties involved in trying the case, in
addition to the time elapsed between the current case at-bar and the
original proceedings, does not negate the duty to withdraw.146 Rather, the
former prosecutor must recuse himself or herself in order to ensure the
neutrality of the judicial process, specifically when it involves evaluating
circumstances his or her own critical decision may have caused.147
With these factors in mind, the Court concluded that Chief Justice
Castille’s authorization to seek the death penalty was a significant,
personal involvement in a critical trial decision.148 As a result, Chief
Justice Castille’s failure to recuse himself from Williams’ case presented
conviction and imposed sentences. Id. By contrast, Williams presents a case in which a judge had
an earlier involvement in a prosecution and could have been one of several prosecutors working on
the case. Id. See also Murchison, 349 U.S. at 135 (asserting that the petitioners in the case objected
to a “trial before the judge who was at the same time the complainant, indicter and prosecutor”).
140. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1906–07.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (noting that while not as visible as a one-man grand jury, a prosecutor such as Justice
Castille could have been responsible for critical decisions including what charges to bring, whether
to extend a plea bargain, and which witnesses to call).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. This is a critical factor on which the dissenting judges base their argument. It is because
of this passage of time that they believe Chief Justice Castille’s involvement is not improper, as it
cannot be considered a single case. E.g., Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1914 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
148. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1908.
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an unconstitutional risk of bias that violated the Due Process Clause.149
According to Justice Kennedy, there can be no doubt that the decision to
seek the death penalty is a critical choice in the adversarial trial
process.150 The decision to ask a jury to end the defendant’s life is one of
the most serious discretionary choices a prosecutor can make.151 The
Court also found that there was no doubt that Chief Justice Castille had a
significant role in making that decision.152 Without his consent, the
Commonwealth would not have been able to seek a death sentence for
Williams.153 Chief Justice Castille’s own comments while running for
judicial office also evidenced his personal responsibility in capital
sentencing decisions.154 During his election campaign, multiple news
outlets reported that he stated that he “sent forty-five people to death
rows” as the District Attorney.155 The Court stated that Chief Justice
Castille’s willingness to take responsibility for the death sentences
imposed during his time as District Attorney indicated that, in his own
opinion, he played an important role in those sentencing decisions and
considered his involvement to be an important duty required of his
position and his office generally.156
Additionally, the Court cited to recusal standards that required
disqualification under the circumstances of the case.157 At the time
149. Id.
150. Id. See also Evan Bernick, Williams v. Pennsylvania: Supreme Court Holds Judge Can’t
Hear Case He Once Prosecuted, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (June 13, 2016), http://www.fedsoc.org/blog/detail/williams-v-pennsylvania-supreme-court-holds-judge-cant-hear-case-he-onceprosecuted (noting that Justice Kennedy pointedly stated that the Court would “not assume that
then-District Attorney Castille treated so major a decision as a perfunctory task requiring little time,
judgment, or reflection on his part”).
151. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1907; see also Richard A. Oppel Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New
Leverage
to
Prosecutors,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
25,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-sentences-help-prosecutors-push-for-pleabargains.html?_r=0 (highlighting that our legal system places an incredible concentration of power
in the hands of prosecutors, and that so much influence now resides with prosecutors that “in the
wrong hands, the criminal justice system can be held hostage”).
152. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1907–08.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1907.
155. Id. See Brief for Amici Curiae Former Judges with Prosecutorial Experience in Support of
Petitioner at 13, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (No. 15-5040) [hereinafter “Brief of
Former Judges with Prosecutorial Experience”] (quoting Katharine Seelye, Castille Keeps His Cool
in Court Run, PHILA. INQUIRER, (Apr. 30, 1993) (reporting Castille as saying, “we locked up Nicky
Scarfo . . . I’ve sent 45 people to death rows”)); see also Lisa Brennan, State Voters Must Choose
Next Supreme Court Member, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, (Oct. 28, 1993) (presenting how the
candidates for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court plan to handle special interest groups’ influence on
the race and Castille citing his record for how such groups may be able to distinguish his position
on key topics without explicitly asking).
156. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1907–08.
157. Id. at 1908; see Brief for American Bar Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner

202

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 49

Williams filed his recusal motion with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
Pennsylvania’s Code of Judicial Conduct required judges to recuse
themselves from any proceeding in which “they served as a lawyer in the
matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom they previously practiced
law served during such association as a lawyer, concerning the
matter.”158 In light of the standards in place in many jurisdictions and
Chief Justice Castille’s own admissions regarding his role in the
sentencing to death of forty-five individuals during his time as District
Attorney, the Court concluded that Chief Justice Castille’s significant,
personal involvement in a critical decision in Williams’ case gave rise to
an unacceptable risk of actual bias.159 This risk gravely endangered the
appearance of neutrality, and Chief Justice Castille’s participation in the
case, according to the Court, “must be forbidden if the guarantee of due
process is to be adequately implemented.”160
Having decided that Chief Justice Castille’s participation in Williams’
proceedings violated due process, the Court turned to whether Williams
was entitled to relief.161 Previously, the Court did not have to decide
whether a due process violation stemming from a jurist’s failure to recuse
amounts to harmless error if the jurist is on a multimember court and the
jurist’s vote was not the deciding vote.162 In Williams, the Court
concluded that a due process violation that results from the participation
of an interested judge is a defect that is not amenable to harmless-error
review, regardless of whether the judge’s vote was dispositive.163 The
fact that the interested judge’s vote was not the determining vote could
simply indicate that the judge was successful in persuading most
at 15 n.19, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (No. 15-5040) [hereinafter “Brief for
American Bar Association”](“Prosecutors with managerial authority and supervisory lawyers must
make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers and non-lawyers in their offices conform to the
Rules of Professional Conduct.”) (quoting ABA Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics & Responsibility, Formal
Op. 467 (2014) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1, 5.3)); see also MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11(A)(1), (A)(6)(b) (2011) (stating that no judge may participate “in any
proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” including where the
judge “[s]erved in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated personally and
substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding”).
158. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1908 (citing PENN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3C (1974,
as amended)).
159. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1908.
160. Id. at 1907–08 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
161. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1909.
162. Id. (reasoning that the Court’s previous reasoning in Lavoie now fails under a due process
test); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co., v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 827–28 (1986) (deciding “whether a
decision of a multimember tribunal must be vacated because of the participation of one member
who had an interest in the outcome of the case,” where that member’s vote was outcome
determinative).
163. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1909 (citing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 141 (2009)).

2017]

The Intolerable Image of Judicial Bias

203

members of the court to accept his position, and therefore does not lessen
the unfair impact this may have on the affected party.164 The Court further
stated that the appearance of neutrality is not based solely on one jurist,
but on the larger institution of which he or she is a part.165 Both the
appearance and reality of impartial judges are necessary to the public’s
trust in judicial pronouncements and thus to the rule of law itself,
according to the Court.166 As a result, the Court held that an
unconstitutional failure to recuse constitutes structural error167 even if the
judge in question did not cast a deciding vote.168 The Court, therefore,
vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and
remanded for further proceedings.169
C. Chief Justice Roberts’ Dissent
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, dissented, asserting that
the Due Process Clause does not require Chief Justice Castille’s
recusal.170 Chief Justice Roberts argued that the majority’s reliance on
Murchison failed to recognize the critical differences between Williams
and Murchison.171 In Murchison, the Court found a violation of the Due
Process Clause when a judge resolved the same legal question, based on
the same facts, that he had already considered as a grand juror in that
same case.172 In contrast, Williams did not allege that Chief Justice
Castille had any prior knowledge of the contested facts at issue in
Williams’ habeas petition.173 Nor did Williams assert, according to Chief
Justice Roberts, that Chief Justice Castille previously made any decision
164. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1909.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (defining a structural error as
one that affects the framework of how the trial proceeds, instead of being simply an error in the
trial process).
168. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1909–10.
169. Id. at 1910 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
170. Id. Chief Justice Roberts contends that the majority opinion rests on “proverb” instead of
actual precedent, specifically that of “no man can be a judge in his own case.” Id. at 1910.
171. Id. at 1910. Chief Justice Roberts contends that to overcome the presumption of honesty
and integrity in those serving as judges, the majority relies on Murchison to its own detriment. See
also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (holding that there is “a presumption of honesty
and integrity in those serving as adjudicators”).
172. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1910 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 138 (1955) (noting that the judge in question “was doubtless more familiar with the facts and
circumstances in which the charges were rooted than was any other witness”).
173. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1910–11 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Similar to the position
forwarded by Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Roberts here appears to make the distinction between
Williams’ prior criminal case and his current petition for habeas corpus as two distinct cases in
controversy. See id.
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on the questions raised by that specific petition.174
Chief Justice Roberts further asserted that Murchison did not support
the majority’s rule for two reasons.175 First, Murchison found a due
process violation because the judge had accused the witnesses of
contempt while sitting as grand jury, and subsequently presided over their
trial on that same charge while sitting as a judge.176 Because the judge
presided directly over the initial phase of the case, he had made up his
mind about the only issue in the case before the trial even started—a
prejudgment that violated the Due Process Clause.177 Secondly,
Murchison did not apply to Williams because Murchison’s central
concern regarded the judge’s recollection of the testimony he heard as
grand juror, giving way to the likelihood that it would “weigh far more
heavily with him than any testimony” given at trial.178 For that reason,
“the Court found the judge was at risk of calling on his own personal
knowledge and impression of what had occurred in the grand jury
room.”179
Chief Justice Roberts further asserted that neither of the two due
process concerns raised in Murchison were present in Williams’ case.180
According to Chief Justice Roberts, this case concerned whether
Williams may overcome the procedural bar on filing an untimely habeas
petition, requiring him to show that the government interfered with his
ability to raise such claims.181 Neither the procedural question nor
Williams’ merits claim concerned the pretrial decision to pursue the death
174. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1911 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts notes that
this case arises out of Williams’ fifth habeas petition, filed in state court in 2012. Id. Specifically,
his habeas petition raises the issue of whether he was entitled to a new sentencing proceeding
because at trial the prosecution failed to turn over certain evidence. Id.
175. Id. at 1913. In acknowledging that Murchison differs in many respects from the current
case, Justice Roberts contends that this Court makes a significant understatement and fails to
recognize the critical differences between the two cases. See also Murchison, 349 U.S. at 133
(discussing the facts of the case, in which a Michigan law authorized the same person to sit as both
judge and jury in the same case).
176. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1913 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Murchison, 349 U.S. at
134–35 (describing how the judge charged the witnesses, from whom he had previously heard
testimony, with criminal contempt, presided over their trial and finally, convicted them).
177. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1913 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
178. Id. (citing Murchison, 349 U.S. at 138).
179. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1913 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (determining that the testimony the
judge had previously heard while serving as a grand juror was “likely to weigh far more heavily
with him than any testimony given” at trial) (citing Murchison, 349 U.S. at 138).
180. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1913 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
181. The only claim Williams sought to raise on the merits was that the prosecution failed to
turn over specific evidence. Id. at 1913. Murchison, on the other hand, presented the problem of
whether having been a part of the accusatory process precluded the judge from being wholly
disinterested when called upon to decide that exact same issue. See Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137.
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penalty.182 Chief Justice Roberts contended that Chief Justice Castille
had not made up his mind about both the evidence in question or the legal
question at-issue in Williams’ habeas petition, neither of which were ever
presented to him while serving as a prosecutor.183 Williams did not assert
that Chief Justice Castille had any prior knowledge of the alleged failure
of the prosecution to turn over undisclosed evidence, nor did he assert
that Chief Justice Castille made any prior decision with respect to that
particular evidence in his role as prosecutor.184
As a result, Chief Justice Roberts challenged the majority decision,
asserting that the Due Process Clause did not prohibit Chief Justice
Castille from presiding over Williams’ case.185 Chief Justice Roberts did,
however, concede that this does not mean it was appropriate for Chief
Justice Castille to do so. Regardless of whether it was ethical or
appropriate, Chief Justice Roberts contended that because the Due
Process Clause does not mandate recusal in this case, state authorities are
the proper channel to determine whether recusal should be required.186
D. Justice Thomas’ Dissent
Justice Thomas also filed a dissent, asserting that the majority’s
conclusion—that Chief Justice Castille’s review of Williams’ petition for
state post-conviction review violated the Due Process Clause—was
flawed.187 Justice Thomas argued that the specter of bias itself in a
judicial proceeding is not sufficient to establish a deprivation of due
process.188 Rather, he contended that the Court should have left this
decision to the judgment of legislatures, bar associations, and individual
adjudicators.189

182. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1913 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
183. See id. at 1914 (noting that the one-and-a-half-page memo prepared by Assistant District
Attorney Foulkes did not discuss the evidence that Williams claims was withheld by the prosecution
at trial).
184. Id. Chief Justice Roberts goes on to assert that even if Chief Justice Castille remembered
the contents of a memo delivered to him almost thirty years later, the memo could not have given
him any special impression of facts or issues not raised specifically in that memo. Id.
185. Chief Justice Roberts further contends that there was no objective risk of actual bias present
in this case, and thus, it was not fundamentally unfair for Chief Justice Castille to participate in the
decision of an issue that had nothing to do with his prior participation in the case. Id.
186. Williams cites to a number of state court decisions and ethics opinions that prohibit a
prosecutor from later serving as a judge in a case that he has in some fashion previously prosecuted,
which Chief Justice Roberts notes do have value. Id.
187. Id. at 1914 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. See id. at 1915 (asserting that to rule in Williams’ favor would be to ignore the Court’s
own posture and precedents commanding less of state post-conviction proceedings than those
involving criminal prosecutions that involve defendants whose convictions are not yet final).
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Justice Thomas focused his dissent on the fact that Williams was not a
criminal defendant, a fact overlooked by the majority’s ruling.190
Williams’ complaint was, rather, that the due process protections in his
state post-conviction proceedings—an entirely separate civil matter—
were lacking.191 As a result, Justice Thomas contended that this was not
a continuation of the original criminal trial.192 Thus, a “single case” in
which Chief Justice Castille acted as both a prosecutor and an adjudicator
did not exist.193 Chief Justice Castille was serving in the district
attorney’s office when Williams’ criminal proceedings ended and his
death sentence became final.194 Justice Thomas further argued that
Williams’ filing of a petition for state post-conviction relief did not
resurrect or continue his already finalized criminal proceeding.195 Justice
Thomas asserted that a post-conviction proceeding is not part of the
criminal proceeding itself but “is in fact considered to be civil in nature,”
bringing with it far fewer procedural protections.196 As a result, Justice
Thomas believed that Williams’ case presented a far different question
from that posited by the majority. 197 Instead, the issue was whether a
judge may review a petition for post-conviction relief when that judge
was previously district attorney during the time when the petitioner’s
criminal case was pending.198
In light of the historical changes within disqualification,199 Justice
Thomas emphasized that disqualification is required only when the newly
appointed judge served as counsel in the same case.200 Looking to Carr
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Here, Justice Thomas highlights the fact that Williams’ sentence has been final for more
than twenty-five years. Only on the fourth appeal did Williams ask Chief Justice Castille to recuse
himself. Williams’ fourth petition was filed over twenty years after his judgment of sentence
became final. Id. at 1916.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1917.
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556–57 (1987)); see, e.g., District
Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68–69 (2009) (explaining that
the right to due process in post-conviction proceedings “is not parallel to a [criminal] trial right”).
197. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1917 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that because Williams’
case is in fact civil, fewer procedural protections exist as compared to criminal proceedings).
198. Id.
199. See Bassett, supra note 69, at 210 (discussing Congress’ abolishment of the duty-to-sit
doctrine).
200. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1918 (Thomas, J., dissenting). From a historical standpoint, the first
federal recusal statute required disqualification not only when the judge was concerned in interest
but also when he had been counsel for either party. See Chapter 36, 2 Congress, Session 1, An Act:
For process in the Courts of the United States, and compensation for the officers of the said courts,
and jurors and witnesses., 1. Stat. 275, 279 (stating that in any case where the judge has been
counsel of either party it shall be the duty of such judge to enter the fact into the minutes of the
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v. Fife,201 Justice Thomas stated that the Court rejected the argument that
a judge is required to recuse himself or herself on the grounds that he or
she previously served as counsel for some of the defendants in another
matter.202 Taylor v. Williams203 reached a similar conclusion, holding
that a judge was not interested in a case simply because he or she
participated in a different case that included the same parties or title.204
A broader rule, according to Justice Thomas, would wreak havoc and
would be at odds with the Court’s historical practice.205 Past judges have
ruled on cases that involved their former clients in the private sector or
their former offices in the public sector.206 Both Tumey and In re
Murchison arguably reflect traditional conceptions of what constitutes a
required judicial disqualification.207 Traditionally, “judges disqualified
themselves when they had a direct and substantial interest in the case or
when they served as counsel in the same case.”208
These historical understandings of judicial qualification, according to
Justice Thomas, resolve Williams’ case.209 Even assuming Chief Justice
court and to order an authenticated copy of the proceedings to be certified to the next court who
shall hear the case as if it had originated in that court); see, e.g., Wilks v. State, 11 S.W. 415, 416
(Tex. App. 1889) (noting that “states followed suit by enacting similar disqualification statutes or
constitutional provisions expanding the common-law rule”). But see Owings v. Gibson, 9 Ky. 515,
51718 (Ky. Ct. App. 1820) (holding that it was for the judge to choose whether he could fairly
adjudicate a case in which he had previously served as a lawyer).
201. 156 U.S. 494 (1895).
202. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1918 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Carr v. Fife, 156 U.S. 494,
49798 (1895)).
203. Taylor v. Williams, 26 Tex. 583 (1863).
204. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 191819 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Taylor v. Williams, 26
Tex. 583, 586 (1863)) (“. . . his having been of counsel in another cause involving the same title.”).
See also Wolfe v. Hines, 20 S.E. 322, 329 (Ga. 1894) (finding that “[a] judge is not disqualified to
try an action because he had been counsel in a prior action by the same plaintiff in relation to the
same land, where he has no interest in the pending action, and none of the questions involved
therein were involved in the prior action”); Cleghorn v. Cleghorn, 5 P. 516 (Cal. 1885) (holding
that “. . . a judge is not disqualified because, before his election to the bench, he had been attorney
for one of the parties in another action, involving one of the issues in the case on trial”).
205. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1919 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Blackburn v. Craufurd, 22
Md. 447, 459 (1864) (noting the potential for the most eminent members of the bar to be, as a result
of their extensive professional relations and experience, “rendered ineligible or useless as judges”).
206. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1919 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803) (discussing how then-Secretary of State John Marshall failed to deliver William
Marbury’s commission and then later, as newly appointed Chief Justice, decided whether
mandamus was an available remedy).
207. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 191920 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 1920; see also Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 514–15 (1927) (forbidding a
judge with a direct, pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case from adjudicating that case).
209. While Chief Justice Castille’s participation may have been unwise, it was within the
bounds of historical practice. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1921 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that “it is not
for Members of this Court to decide from time to time whether a process approved by the legal
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Castille’s supervisory role as District Attorney could qualify as serving
as counsel in Williams’ criminal case, that case ended nearly five years
before Chief Justice Castille was elected to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.210 While Chief Justice Castille may have been “personally
involved in a critical trial decision,” Justice Thomas asserted that the trial
in question was Williams’ criminal trial and not the post-conviction
proceedings currently before the Court.211 Because Chief Justice Castille
did not act as counsel and judge in the same case, his participation in the
post-conviction proceedings in question did not violate the Due Process
Clause.212 The majority’s holding, Justice Thomas concluded, departs
both from common-law practice and precedent by ignoring the important
distinction between criminal and post-conviction proceedings.213
III. ANALYSIS
In creating a new, albeit narrow, constitutional rule pertaining to
judicial recusal, the Court in Williams continued the current trend in
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding judicial recusal and the
Fourteenth Amendment.214 This Part first demonstrates how the Court’s
decision in Williams is in keeping with Supreme Court precedent.215
Second, this Part examines how the Court’s holding is in line with stricter
statutory and ethics codes provisions pertaining to judicial recusal.216
Finally, this Part highlights how Williams is reflective of the need for
public confidence in the government, and specifically the judiciary, in
light of the current political climate.217
traditions of our people is ‘due’ process”).
210. As a result, Justice Thomas contends that Castille did not serve as both prosecutor and
judge in the case at hand. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1921.
211. Id. (noting that this post-conviction proceeding cannot be considered an extension of
Williams’ criminal case but is instead a new civil proceeding). See also Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551, 55657 (1987) (finding that the state-created right to counsel on postconviction
review did not require the appointed counsel to withdraw when that counsel previously found the
case frivolous on direct appeal).
212. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1921 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
213. Id.
214. See Bernick, supra note 150 (noting that the Court in its holding in Williams continued the
vitality of the legal principal that “no person may be a judge in his own cause”).
215. See Bernick, supra note 150 (discussing how the “Due Process of Law Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments have long been understood by the Supreme Court to guarantee
(among other things) impartial adjudication—adjudication free from bias or even the probability of
bias”).
216. See infra note 261 (highlighting the stricter state statutory requirements for mandatory
judicial recusal).
217. See Michael L. Buenger, The Need for Solid Court Leadership: Reflections on the National
Symposium on Court Management, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (2011),
http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctadmin/id/1842 (discussing the importance of
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The requirement of an impartial judicial system is central to the
constitutional guarantee that all persons are entitled to due process of the
law.218 A touchstone of the Court’s recusal law, first proliferated by
President James Madison, is that no man is allowed to be a judge in his
own case, as his interest would bias his judgment and thus corrupt his
integrity.219 The Court has long recognized, and reiterated most recently
in Caperton, that a fair trial by a fair body is the core requirement of due
process.220 It is from this adage that the Court determined that Chief
Justice Castille’s participation in Williams’ proceedings violated the Due
Process Clause. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that the Due Process
Clause’s interdiction against biased judges includes circumstances in
which a judge’s interest in the case may cause him or her to fail to “hold
the balance clear and true,” as required by Tumey.221
The current standard for determining whether a judge’s refusal to
recuse himself or herself violates due process is an objective one: whether
the circumstances of the case would create a possible temptation for the
average man as a judge to lead him to fail to hold the balance clear and
true.222 Under this standard, the question that must be asked is whether
an average judge in a similar position would likely be neutral, or, put
another way, whether there is a potential for bias, not whether the judge
is actually and subjectively biased.223 This objective analysis requires an
evaluation of both a person’s psychological tendencies and general
human weaknesses, as well as a determination of whether the interest
poses a risk of bias or prejudgment.224 Recusal is required when, after
the public’s perception of an impartial and fair judiciary branch).
218. Brief for The Constitutional Accountability Center, supra note 5, at 1; see, e.g., Bassett,
supra note 69, at 183 (stating that “[t]he notion of an impartial trial under the direction of an
unbiased judge is a central tenet of our system of justice”).
219. Brief for The Constitutional Accountability Center, supra note 5, at 1; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (stating that no man should
be the judge of his own cause because his own interest would bias his judgment and therefore
corrupt his integrity).
220. Brief for The Constitutional Accountability Center, supra note 5, at 1; see also Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (“[A] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.”) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
221. Brief for The Constitutional Accountability Center, supra note 5, at 4.
222. Brief of Former Appellate Court Jurists as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–5,
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (No. 15-5040) [hereinafter “Brief of Former Appellate
Court Jurists”]; see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986) (quoting Ward v.
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (“[T]he issue is whether the ‘situation is one which
would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true.’”).
223. Brief of Former Appellate Court Jurists, supra note 222, at 5 (quoting Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971)).
224. Id. See also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (stating that the objective analysis
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making such an inquiry, the likelihood of bias is too high to be considered
constitutionally tolerable.225
The Court has also, over time, identified circumstances in which a
judge’s interest in the outcome should disqualify the judge from
participation.226 In Tumey v. Ohio, the Court determined that, if an
average judge sitting on a case is offered the possible temptation not to
“hold the balance nice, clear, and true,” the judge must recuse himself or
herself.227 Another circumstance requiring recusal occurs when an attack
by a party or counsel on a judge’s character or actions would cause an
average judge in that position not to be neutral.228 Finally, the third
circumstance, as established by Caperton, is when a party to the case who
has a personal stake in its outcome makes a significant contribution to the
reviewing judge’s election campaign.229 While the dissent argues that
there is no established precedent for the precise circumstances found in
Williams, the Court has nevertheless recognized that the term “interest”
cannot be defined with precision; circumstances and relationships must
be considered on a case-by-case basis when determining whether a
judge’s interest is direct enough to merit recusal.230
The Court’s holding in Williams applies the objective standard set forth
in Lavoie and builds upon the approach taken in Caperton, as the majority
looked to the totality of the circumstances presented when determining
that bias did, in fact, exist.231 There are few circumstances in which a
former prosecutor who subsequently becomes a judge can “hold the
balance nice, clear and true” when reviewing an action he or she took on
examines whether the interest “poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice
must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.”).
225. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (quoting Withrow, 421
U.S. at 47).
226. Brief of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers in
Support of Petitioner at 5, Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (No. 15-5040) [hereinafter
“Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers”].
227. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927); Brief of The American Academy of Appellate
Lawyers, supra note 222, at 5.
228. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 5; see generally
Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 466 (holding that “a defendant in criminal contempt proceedings should be
given a public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor”).
229. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 5; see Caperton,
556 U.S. at 876 (recusing a judge as a matter of due process because of campaign contributions).
230. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). See also CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW 1 (Kris Markarian ed., 2nd ed. 2010) (noting
that a judge’s ability to impartially perform his duties is dependent on decisionmaking that is free
from conflicts of interest).
231. See Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226 at 5 (stating
that the “Court required that the possibility of bias be measured objectively, based on the likely
effect on an ‘average judge’”).
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behalf of his or her former department.232 When a judge reviews
something he or she did as a prosecutor, there is, at the very least, the
appearance of bias and a serious risk of actual bias.233 To ask a person to
sit in judgment of his or her own past performance with a neutral
approach would be imprudent.234
As noted by the majority, a prosecutor who participates in a major
adversarial decision is the most central attorney in the trial process at
large.235 A prosecutor is responsible for a number of critical decisions,
including sentencing.236 The chief prosecutor, as noted in the National
Prosecution Standards of the National District Attorneys Association, is
also ultimately responsible to the community for the performance of the
prosecutorial process and the performance of his or her entire office.237
In light of this responsibility, the actions of these prosecutors can be
directly imputed to the chief prosecutor when analyzing whether he or
she should be required to recuse himself or herself in a later
proceeding.238 From an institutional and community perspective, the
District Attorney is ultimately responsible for the entire office’s
prosecutions; as a result, the actions of all of the assistant district
attorneys could be imputed to Chief Justice Castille for the purposes of a
due process analysis.239
Though the dissenters urge that Chief Justice Castille himself did not
directly pursue the death sentence in Williams’ prior criminal
232. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 6. See also
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532 (reaffirming a judge’s decision not to recuse himself).
233. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 6.
234. Id. See also Jennifer K. Robbennolt and Matthew Taksin, Can Judges Determine Their
Own Impartiality?, 41 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., no. 2, 2010, at 24, 24 (stating that “[p]eople believe
they are objective, see themselves as more ethical and fair than others, and experience a ‘bias blind
spot,’ the tendency to see bias in others but not in themselves”).
235. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1906 (2016).
236. Id. at 1907–08.
237. Brief of Former Judges with Prosecutorial Experience, supra note 155, at 13. See also
NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASSOC., NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 14 (3d ed.); David A. Harris,
The Interaction and Relationship Between Prosecutors and Police Officers in the United States,
and How this Affects Police Reform Efforts, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 54, 59 (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, eds., 2012) (“The elected prosecutor sets office
policy, hires and fires staff, serves as the public face of the office, and sometimes makes important
decisions in individual cases . . . The elected nature of the position means that the state prosecutor
is ultimately accountable only to the voters of the jurisdiction.”).
238. Brief of Former Judges with Prosecutorial Experience, supra note 155, at 14; see, e.g.,
United States v. Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466, 467 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the “[r]esponsibility for
prosecution and the precedent investigation is that of the United States Attorney in his district; other
attorneys are only his assistants”); United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.3d 337, 339 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979)
(noting that “[e]ven if [the former prosecutor] did not review these papers himself, knowledge of
their contents is imputable to him because of his supervisory status”).
239. Brief of Former Judges with Prosecutorial Experience, supra note 155, at 14.
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proceedings, it is difficult to see how Chief Justice Castille’s approval of
pursuing such a severe penalty could not be deemed a direct, personal
involvement.240 Even if the actions of the prosecutors were not imputed
to Chief Justice Castille, his involvement in the case at a personal level
should nevertheless require his recusal.241 Without his approval, the
Commonwealth would not have been able to seek a death sentence
against Williams.242 Though the Commonwealth asserted that the act of
approving the request to pursue the death penalty amounted to nothing
more than a brief administrative act, there is little indication that Chief
Justice Castille treated such a decision with so little judgment or
reflection.243 Rather, while campaigning for his seat on the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, Chief Justice Castille highlighted his record of
placing forty-five individuals—a list inclusive of Williams—on death
row.244 The now-Chief Justice further went on to champion his support
of the death penalty in the media.245 In a newspaper article published
during Chief Justice Castille’s election campaign, when asked where he
stood on the death penalty, he asserted that he sent forty-five people to
death row and that those questioning him “get the hint.”246 While these
statements in favor of the death penalty are not directly tied to Williams,
they are relevant in that they demonstrate that Chief Justice Castille took
responsibility for the death penalty convictions given out during his time
as District Attorney.247
240. Id. at 14–15; see also Ostrer, 597 F.2d at 339 n.4 (holding that “[e]ven if [the former
prosecutor] did not review these papers himself, knowledge of their contents is imputable to him
because of his supervisory status”). See generally Arnpriester, 37 F.3d at 467 (“Responsibility for
prosecution and the precedent investigation is that of the United States Attorney in his district; other
attorneys are only his assistants.”).
241. Brief of Former Judges with Prosecutorial Experience, supra note 155, at 14; see PA. R.
PROF. CONDUCT 3.8(a) (stating that, among other things, “[t]he prosecutor in a criminal case
shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause”).
242. Brief of Former Judges with Prosecutorial Experience, supra note 155, at 14.
243. Id. at 14–15.
244. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 7.
245. Id.
246. Id. An article published on October 28, 1993, quoted Castille as stating: “There’s really no
solution to it. . . . You ask people to vote for you, they want to know where you stand on the death
penalty. I can certainly say I sent 45 people to death row as District Attorney of Philadelphia. They
sort of get the hint.” Lisa Brennan, State Voters Must Choose Next Supreme Court Member, Legal
Intelligencer, Oct. 28, 1993, at 4.
247. Brief of Former Judges with Prosecutorial Experience, supra note 155, at 18. Chief Justice
Castille’s comments regarding his involvement in the decision to grant the death penalty have been
contradictory. During his electoral campaign, Chief Justice Castille asserted that he was responsible
for sending these defendants to death row. See Brennan, supra note 246. However, when asked to
recuse himself for this reason, Chief Justice Castille asserted that his role in the authorization of the
death penalty was an administrative formality. See Commonwealth v. Rainey, 912 A.2d 755, 757–
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The focus of Williams’ post-conviction proceedings also puts Chief
Justice Castille’s neutrality into question, as the main concern of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review of the PCRA Court’s decision was
whether the alleged misconduct by the prosecutor caused the suppression
of exculpatory evidence and if the exclusion of this evidence materially
impacted Williams’ sentencing.248 The content of Williams’ allegations
directly implicates the conduct of the prosecutors who were under Chief
Justice Castille’s supervision.249 While the idea of prosecutorial
misconduct does not directly translate to a personal interest in the case,
had the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided differently, there could
have been broader implications for the office that would have directly
impacted Chief Justice Castille.250 If the court determined that a
prosecutor in the office overseen by Chief Justice Castille had in fact
engaged in misconduct, a larger inquiry might have been made to
determine if such misconduct was systemic or if Chief Justice Castille
himself condoned or encouraged such behavior.251 The comments made
by the PCRA Court create the inference of the presence of such systemic
misconduct, as the PCRA Court determined that Chief Justice Castille’s
office had “engaged in ‘gamesmanship’ in order to secure a death
sentence.”252
In his dissent, Justice Thomas asserts that the majority’s holding is, in
fact, contrary to current Court jurisprudence.253 Relying upon Tumey and
Murchison, Justice Thomas highlights the historical underpinnings of
judicial recusal that traditionally required judges to disqualify themselves
if they had both a direct and substantial pecuniary interest, or if they had
previously served in the role of counsel in the same case.254 Because
Chief Justice Castille did not act as both counsel and judge in the same
58 (Pa. 2006).
248. Brief of Former Appellate Court Jurists, supra note 222, at 5; see also Williams v.
Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1904 (2016).
249. Brief of Former Appellate Court Jurists, supra note 222, at 5.
250. Id. at 5–6.
251. Id. at 6.
252. The Former Appellate Court Jurists, in their amicus brief, also assert that “Chief Justice
Castille’s strong statements in concurrence further call into question his impartiality and the degree
of influence that his passionately held views may have had on his colleagues,” and that “[e]ven if
the attack in his concurring opinion were warranted, Chief Justice Castille left his impartiality, and
thus the integrity of the decision, open to serious question. . . .” Id.
253. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1919 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Due Process Clause
compels judges to recuse themselves only in narrow circumstances); see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (cautioning that “all questions of judicial qualification may not involve
constitutional validity”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986) (“The Due
Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications.”).
254. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1919 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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case, according to Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Castille’s participation
in the post-conviction proceedings did not violate the Due Process
Clause.255 Justice Thomas thus asserts that “the holding departs both
from common-law practice and the Supreme Court’s prior precedents by
ignoring the critical distinction between criminal and post-conviction
proceedings.”256
However, his arguments that Chief Justice Castille had no “direct,
personal, substantial pecuniary interest” in the adjudication of Williams’
fourth post-conviction petition, and that Chief Justice Castille did not
serve as both prosecutor and judge in the case before the court, are
unpersuasive.257 Though the case in which Chief Justice Castille directly
participated as District Attorney was a criminal proceeding, whereas the
current case is civil in nature, he would still be asked to review an action
that he took both directly and indirectly by considering the issue of
misconduct.258 When a judge is forced to review his or her own actions,
as in this case, there is at least an appearance of bias and at most a serious
risk of bias that is constitutionally intolerable.259 Similar to the judge atissue in Murchison, Chief Justice Castille would likely be unable to set
aside his view of the Williams’ case he developed when overseeing the
prosecution of the case, whether or not it was part of the same criminal
or civil proceeding.260
255. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1920 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that even assuming Chief
Justice Castille’s role as District Attorney was the equivalent to serving as counsel, the case ended
almost five years before Castille ever joined the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania).
256. Justice Thomas highlights that in his criminal trial, Williams was presumed innocent and
the Constitution guaranteed him counsel and a public trial by a jury, and empowered him to
confront those witnesses against him. But, in his post-conviction proceedings, this presumption of
innocence has disappeared. Id. See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (discussing
the presumption of innocence). See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932).
257. Evan Bernick commented:
[E]ven if one grants the validity of the dissenters’ distinction between a criminal
proceeding and a post-conviction proceeding, the majority’s argument that Castille was
likely to be psychologically wedded to his initial decision to seek the death penalty for
Williams in determining whether to vacate a stay of Williams’s execution went
unanswered.
Bernick, supra note 150.
258. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1919 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Brief of The American
Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 6.
259. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 6. (noting that
because the meaning behind judicial review is the requirement for a fair and unbiased review by
neutral parties, “[w]hen a judge undertakes to review an action that he or she took as an executive
branch official, there is at least an appearance of bias, and a serious risk of actual bias”).
260. See Brief of Former Judges with Prosecutorial Experience, supra note 155, at 15 (stating
that “[g]iven this prior involvement, Chief Justice Castille’s participation in Petitioner’s case
seriously impugns the public perception of the judiciary and threatens the integrity and legitimacy
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The Court’s decision in Williams is also in keeping with the current
recusal provisions of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct and
Model Codes of Judicial Conduct (“the Code”) that work in tandem with
the constitutional due process requirements set forth in the Fourteenth
Amendment.261 Due to the greater restrictions and greater protections
found in state codes of judicial conduct, as stated by the majority in
Caperton, the Due Process Clause “demarks only the outer boundaries of
judicial disqualifications,” with due process violations arising only in
extreme circumstances.262 The Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires
the integrity and impartiality of judges to promote overall public
confidence in the fairness and integrity of the judiciary. 263 The Code has
historically stated that recusal is specifically required when a judge
previously participated in the case as counsel.264 Even without this direct
mandate at the federal level, all states, including Pennsylvania, have
required recusal in such a circumstance for several decades.265
The Pennsylvania Code, based on the 1972 Model Code, and in place
at the time of Williams’ request for Chief Justice Castille’s recusal,
provides that judges should disqualify themselves in a proceeding where
their neutrality could reasonably be questioned.266 The Pennsylvania
Code further provides a list of potential circumstances in which recusal
is required, including instances where the judge has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of the disputed facts
related to the proceeding, or where the judge previously served as a
lawyer in the case at bar.267 Therefore, the ethics codes at both the state
and federal levels prohibit a judge from participating in a case where his
of the judicial process.”); see also State Bar of Michigan, Advisory Opinion JI-34 (Dec. 21, 1990)
(asserting that “a judge who was the chief prosecutor in the county is disqualified from hearing any
portion of a criminal or civil case involving the state or county which was initiated or pending while
the judge served as prosecutor”).
261. Brief for American Bar Association, supra note 157, at 7.
262. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889–90 (2009) (quoting Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986)); Bassett, supra note 69, at 196.
263. Brief for American Bar Association, supra note 157, at 8; see also Williams-Yulee v. Fla.
Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (noting that this has been recognized by the Court as a “vital
state interest . . . of the highest order”).
264. Brief for American Bar Association, supra note 157, at 12.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 12–13. See generally Penn. Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.11 (2014) (explaining
when a judge should disqualify himself or herself from a proceeding).
267. Penn. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.11 (1974, as amended); see also Brief for The
American Bar Association, supra note 157, at 13. The official commentary to the Code indicated
that a government lawyer is not always imputed with the conflicts of the lawyer’s former
colleagues. However, a judge formerly employed by a governmental agency should disqualify
himself in a proceeding if his impartiality might reasonably be questioned because of his
association. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3C(1) CMT. (1972).
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or her neutrality could likely be questioned.268 Because the Code and the
Due Process Clause work in tandem, the failure to recuse in this case not
only is unethical under the standards laid out by the Code, but also
simultaneously violates due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.269
The Williams decision is reflective of the increasing need for public
confidence in the judiciary in light of the current political environment.270
As the Court held in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, “[t]he importance of
public confidence in the integrity of judges stems from the place of the
judiciary in the government.”271 Its authority depends largely on the
public’s willingness to respect and follow its decisions. 272 As a result,
public perception of judicial integrity is of the utmost importance.273 The
Code also requires judges to treat and honor the judicial office as a public
trust, aiming to preserve and enhance legitimacy and confidence in the
legal system.274 Additionally, judges should act at all times in a way that
promotes public confidence in the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary and must avoid at a very minimum the appearance of
impropriety.275
A biased decisionmaker is not only constitutionally unacceptable, but
also the very type of unfairness that the American system of law has
268. Brief for American Bar Association, supra note 157, at 14; see also E. Thode, Reporter’s
Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct at 63 (1973) (“If the former [governmental] agency lawyer, now
a judge, served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, he is disqualified.”).
269. See generally Brief for American Bar Association, supra note 157 (arguing that Chief
Justice Castille violated “uniform ethics rules and due process protections” when he failed to recuse
himself).
270. See John Ingold, Why Today’s Political Climate Scares Judges, THE DENVER POST (June
12, 2016), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/06/12/ethics-political-trump-judgeswhy-todayspolitical-climate-scares-judges/ (discussing then-presidential nominee Donald Trump’s attempts to
politicize the judiciary and attack the credibility of the justice system as independent in nature); see
generally Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226 (arguing that lack
of confidence in the judicial system causes societal unrest).
271. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015).
272. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 4–5; see also
Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666 (discussing the need for the public’s confidence).
273. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 4–5; see also
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009) (“Judicial integrity is . . . a state
interest of the highest order.”).
274. Brief for American Bar Association, supra note 157, at 10; see generally Penn. Code of
Judicial Conduct pmbl. (2014); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2007).
275. Brief for American Bar Association, supra note 157, at 13; Penn. Code R. 1.2 (2014);
Model Code r. 1.2 (2007); see also Penn. Code Canon 2 (1974) (stating that judges are required to
avoid the appearance of impropriety and to conduct themselves in a manner that promotes integrity
and impartiality in the judiciary); Model Code Canon 5A(3)(a) (2003) (“[A] candidate for a judicial
office shall . . . act in a manner consistent with the impartiality, integrity and independence of the
judiciary. . . .”).
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always endeavored to prevent.276 The Supreme Court has emphasized the
appearance of fairness as a crucial tenet of a free society, holding that
“[t]he power and the prerogative of a court to [elaborate principles of law]
rest, in the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments.” 277 The
public’s respect for the courts—and the judiciary as a whole—depends
upon the issuing court’s complete probity. 278 In Caperton, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the common law ban on judges serving in cases in
which they have a specific pecuniary interest does not establish nor define
the outer reaches of the Due Process Clause’s protections.279 As a result,
application of the Due Process Clause is not limited to cases involving
actual bias, but can include those that present a potential for bias.280
Rather, due process seeks to protect the appearance of potential bias or
impropriety to ensure public confidence in the judiciary and thus to
protect its integrity.281 To decide whether a judicial conflict violates the
Due Process Clause, the question the Court should ask is whether, under
a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the
interest creates a risk of actual bias or prejudgment such that the judge
must recuse himself or herself to ensure that the guarantee of due process
is adequately upheld.282
When a judge plays a direct role in prosecuting a criminal defendant
in prior proceedings, the judge’s later participation in reviewing that same
defendant’s conviction and sentencing violates the defendant’s right to
due process of law, creates the appearance of misconduct, and also likely
276. Brief for The Constitutional Accountability Center, supra note 5, at 12; see Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (“Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable
but ‘our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.’”)
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
277. Brief for The Constitutional Accountability Center, supra note 5, at 12 (quoting
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002)).
278. Id.; Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 793 (noting that judicial integrity is a state
interest of the highest order).
279. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 882 (2009); Brief of The American
Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 5.
280. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883 (“[T]he Due Process Clause has been implemented by objective
standards that do not require proof of actual bias.”).
281. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1979). Disagreeing with the
Gannett majority, however, Justice Blackmun argued that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a
public trial reflects “the notion, deeply rooted in the common law, that ‘justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.’” Id. at 412 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960)).
282. Brief for The Constitutional Accountability Center, supra note 214, at 4 (discussing that
the “conflict of interest inquiry under the Due Process Clause asks whether under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the interest poses such a risk of actual
bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
adequately implemented”); see also Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883–84 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
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creates the appearance of an unconstitutional conflict of interest.283
Therefore, circumstances where a judge participates both as a prosecutor
and as a reviewer negatively impacts the public’s perception of the courts
and violates the defendant’s right to due process of law.284 The fear of
potential impropriety is magnified when the judge is a former prosecutor
who focused his campaign for the judiciary on having “sent forty-five
people to death row,” one of whom is the defendant now before that
judge.285
Judicial authority is ultimately generated from the public’s trust that a
trial will be fair.286 Because bias or the potential for bias can negatively
impact the public’s perception of the judicial system as a whole, due
process requires that decisions be put forth by a neutral court, without any
judges that have any form of bias present.287 Avoiding bias is more than
a formality—it is an essential condition of due process.288 Accordingly,
the purpose of recusal is to protect actual judicial impartiality, as well as
the appearance of judicial impartiality, which are both necessary to
ensure due process.289 The procedural protections provided by the rules
of evidence and judicial procedures are of little value if a judge has an
interest in the outcome, or is partial toward one of the litigants prior to
ever hearing the evidence at bar.290 Thus, the constitutional requirement
for judicial impartiality requires recusal in the face of both actual and
perceived biases.291
283. Brief for The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 3.
284. Id. See Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508
U.S. 602, 617–18 (1993) (emphasizing the need both to “satisfy the appearance of justice” and to
avoid “the possibility of bias”).
285. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 3.
286. Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc., 151 Cal. App. 4th 994, 1008 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); see
generally Buenger, supra note 217 (addressing what the court system needs to do to adjust to the
new realities facing courts).
287. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 3; see Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864–69 (1992) (holding that “[t]he Court’s power
lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s
acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it
demands”).
288. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 4 (noting that
“[j]udges wear robes not merely out of tradition, but to signal that whatever their individual views,
they act as objective neutrals, not as partisans, when they serve the law).
289. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821–22 (1986) (indicating that an impartial
tribunal is required for due process); see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)
(determining that “[t]he Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested
tribunal in both civil and criminal cases”).
290. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 821–22; see also Brief of The American Academy of Appellate
Lawyers, supra note 226 (arguing against a “no harm no foul” rationalization when an unbiased
judge fails to recuse himself or herself).
291. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (holding that “[e]ven if there is no showing of
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The Court’s decision in Williams arises out of a social and political
environment in which there is an ever-increasing need to instill public
confidence in the government at large.292 Alexander Hamilton once
stated that the powers possessed by the executive branch, specifically
those enabled within the judiciary, have neither force nor will, but simply
judgment.293 The power of the courts to keep the public’s trust and
confidence in its administration of justice lies in the soundness of its
judgment.294 The American public’s trust in the judicial branch of the
federal government has fallen significantly in recent years, with a 2015
Gallup poll noting a record-low 53 percent of those surveyed say they
have “a great deal” or “a fair amount” of trust in the judiciary.295 Though
the public has consistently had a higher level of trust in the judiciary as
compared to the legislative and executive branches, total trust in all three
branches of government has trended downward, indicating widespread
dissatisfaction with government overall.296
As noted in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the American Bar
Association states that, to promote public confidence in the judiciary, a
judge must act at all times in a fashion that avoids impropriety or the
appearance of impropriety.297 It is out of this maxim that Williams
emerges, and it is for this very purpose that the majority created its new
rule for recusal: maintaining trust in the judiciary in an era of significant
governmental distrust.

actual bias in the tribunal, . . . due process is denied by circumstances that create the likelihood or
the appearance of bias”).
292. See Ingold, supra note 270 (noting that as the political environment continues to become
more antagonistic, legal observers have begun to fear that the notion of an independent judiciary is
also at risk); see generally Buenger, supra note 217 (addressing what the court system needs to do
adjust to the new realities facing courts).
293. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); Buenger, supra note 217.
294. Buenger, supra note 217.
295. These results are based on Gallup’s Sept. 9–13 Governance poll, which has measured trust
in the three branches of the federal government annually since 2001. Gallup’s full trend analysis
on the public’s trust in government reaches back to 1972, with regular updates conducted beginning
in 1997. Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in the U.S. Judicial Branch Sinks to New Low of 53%, GALLUP
(Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185528/trust-judicial-branch-sinks-new-low.aspx.
296. The judicial branch retains higher public trust than either of the other branches of
government at 53 percent, compared with 45 percent for the executive branch and 32 percent for
the legislative branch. Compare this with the statistics taken only six years ago, when 76 percent
said they trusted the judicial branch, 61 percent said they trusted the executive branch and 45
percent said they trusted the legislative branch. Jones, supra note 295.
297. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1, r. 1.2 (stating the standard for a judge’s
behavior to promote confidence in the judiciary); see also Fourth National Symposium on Court
Management, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (2010), www.ncsc.org/4thsymposium
(“Given the natural constitutional and political tensions that are inherent in our system of
government . . . the judiciary must work constantly to explain itself.”).
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IV. IMPACT
By holding that there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a
judge had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical
decision with respect to the defendant’s case, the Court in Williams
created a new constitutional recusal rule.298 Although the immediate
effects of the Court’s decision are narrow in scope, the decision could
ultimately be considered an important step in the creation of a new
constitutional law of recusal.299 Though the Court offered some relief for
possible instances of judicial bias, the rule is constricted in nature, as the
Court limits its holding to prosecutorial experience as a specific instance
of intolerable bias.300 The rule applies at the case-level, meaning it
requires the recusal of a judge who had previously been involved in
deciding one component of the case and currently presides over that same
case.301 This prohibition on prior prosecutorial decisions appears to be
absolute in nature.302
The Court also offered helpful distinctions pertaining to the nature of
judicial bias, stating that, for instance, bias is easy to discern in others and
difficult to notice objectively in oneself. 303 In emphasizing that the
relevant inquiry is objective, the Court stated that the analysis required is
whether the average judge in a similar position is likely to be unbiased or
whether there is an intolerable and unconstitutional potential for bias.304
The Court also elaborated on the concept of bias, noting several specific

298. Richard M. Re, Opinion Analysis: Another Step Toward Constitutionalizing Recusal
Obligations,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
9,
2016,
2:20
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-another-step-toward-constitutionalizingrecusal-obligations/.
299. See id. This narrow ruling stems from concern regarding a bright-line rule and its potential
effects on the judiciary. Eisenberg emphasized this issue by noting during oral arguments that “we
don’t want to have a situation where the only people who can become judges and sit on cases are
people with no prior experience.” Re, supra note 11.
300. See Re, supra note 298 (noting that the rule did not extend beyond the facts presented in
the case). Arguably, the Justices were worried about creating a broader recusal rule that might
prevent judges with governmental service, even including themselves, from performing their jobs.
Re, supra note 11.
301. Re, supra note 298. It is interesting to note that Justice Alito remarked near the end of oral
arguments that he couldn’t see a clear rule that would encompass the situation presented in Williams
“other than a rule that said that a judge is required by the Constitution to recuse in a case in which
that judge had personal participation as a prosecutor.” Re, supra note 11.
302. Re, supra note 298.
303. Id.; see also Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2016) (asserting that because
bias is difficult to discern in oneself, the Court must apply an objective standard that avoids having
to determine whether actual bias is present).
304. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455
(1971); Re, supra note 298.
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types of psychological effects that can potentially bias a judge.305 For
instance, a judge who has previously acted as an accuser may not be able
to set aside any personal interest in the outcome, or may be
“psychologically wedded” to his or her prior position out of a desire to
maintain an appearance of consistency. 306 Finally, the judge’s personal
knowledge about the case may have an unbalanced effect on his or her
weighing of the evidence that detracts from the strengths and weaknesses
in the parties’ actual arguments.307
The decision in Williams will likely have the most striking impact
within the Court itself, as it may force the Court to look inward at its own
recusal practices.308 Supreme Court Justices ultimately have the final say
on their recusal obligations in each case presented and, unlike recusal
decisions in lower courts or state courts, no avenue for the appeal of that
decision exists.309 Therefore, an unclear standard has developed that can
lead to an appearance of impropriety regardless of whether any real
impropriety exists.310 As a result, public trust in the Court has declined
to an all-time low in recent years.311 Decisions rendered by judges who
appear biased increase public skepticism of the judiciary and undermine
the overall integrity of the courts.312 Whether or not it is responsible for
this decrease in public confidence, the Court’s current recusal standard is
305. See Re, supra note 298 (outlining the types of bias provided by the majority in Williams
that should be considered impermissible).
306. Id.; see also Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1906 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 57
(1975)).
307. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1906 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 138 (1955)); see also
Brief for American Bar Association, supra note 157, at 13–15 (discussing why the Pennsylvania
Code of Judicial Conduct required Chief Justice Castille to recuse himself).
308. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court, in Recusal Case, May Find Itself Looking Inward, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/us/politics/supreme-court-in-recusalcase-may-find-itself-looking-inward.html?_r=1 (exploring the recusal decision by the Supreme
Court for Ronald D. Castille); see also Richard M. Re, Argument Analysis: Seeking A Recusal Rule
That The Justices Can Live With, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 29, 2016, 6:13 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/argument-analysis-seeking-a-recusal-rule-that-the-justicescan-live-with/ (commenting that in discussing the remedy issue presented in the case, Justice Breyer
noted, “[w]ell, this is common in the situation where someone’s appointed to this Court”).
309. Luke McFarland, Is Anyone Listening? The Duty to Sit Still Matters Because the Justices
Say It Does, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 677 (2011); see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist.
of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 915–16 (2004) (mem.) (discussing the different effects of recusal of
appellate judges and recusal of Supreme Court Justices).
310. McFarland, supra note 309, at 677.
311. Confidence in Public Institutions, GALLUP, http:// www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidenceinstitutions.aspx (last visited Aug. 25, 2017) (finding the current level of public confidence in the
Supreme Court at 36 percent). Gallup has measured confidence in the Court since 1973, with the
lowest level registered at 32 percent in 2008. Id.; McFarland, supra note 309, at 684.
312. Statement of Recusal Policy, 114 S. Ct. 52 (1993), reprinted in RICHARD E. FLAMM,
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 1068–70 (1996);
McFarland, supra note 304, at 684.
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neither strict nor transparent enough to protect its credibility. This comes
at a time when the public has a heightened skepticism toward the United
States’ long-standing institutions.313 Congress attempted to eliminate the
duty to sit by amending 28 U.S.C. § 455 in 1974 in an effort to reestablish
public confidence in the judicial system.314 Despite this effort, the fear
that the duty to sit has been revived by the Court in recent years
prevails.315
Though Congress abolished the duty-to-sit doctrine over forty years
ago, some courts still attempt to rely on the doctrine to mitigate the
potential for recusal.316 The duty to sit dictates that the judge assigned to
a case must hear the case unless an unambiguous demonstration of bias
is made.317 Invoking the duty to sit allows the judge-at-issue to undergo
a balancing test, weighing the effect of recusal with the duty to sit—a test
that ultimately limits recusal to only those circumstances where the
appearance of bias offsets the duty to sit.318 This determination is highly
susceptible to the judge’s subjective viewpoint of the circumstances and
allows for the impermissible likelihood that the judge will “tip the
scales.”319 Therefore, this balancing test ultimately allows the judge to
evade the intended effect of the recusal standard.320
Two recent cases illustrate the need for an introspective look into the
recusal practices of the Supreme Court.321 In 1972, then-Justice
Rehnquist, a former Justice Department official, published a statement
justifying his participation in a decision about Army surveillance of
domestic political groups, despite his previous defense of the spying
program in congressional testimony and his criticism of the lawsuit
during his tenure as a government lawyer. 322 In 2004, Justice Scalia
313. See Editorial, Recusals and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, at A26 (“The court’s
voluntary system of recusal isn’t enough to protect its impartiality and credibility. The justices
decide on their own when their ‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’ There is no review,
no requirement for explanation and no code of discipline as a check.”).
314. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 05-02:
Procedures For Issuing Recusal Orders (Mar. 21, 2005) at 5 (discussing the duty to sit, witnesses
at the hearing on the 1974 amendments unanimously agreed that abolishing the doctrine “would
enhance public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial system”).
315. McFarland, supra note 309, at 685.
316. Bassett, supra note 69, at 202.
317. Id.; McFarland, supra note 309, at 685.
318. Bassett, supra note 69, at 202.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See generally Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Justice Rehnquist holding that he was
not required to recuse himself in a case in which he had not participated, either of record or in any
advisory capacity); see also Liptak, supra note 308.
322. Laird, 409 U.S. at 827.
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justified his participation in a case involving the actions of Vice President
Dick Cheney in his official capacity as Vice President, despite the fact
that the two had recently gone duck hunting together.323 On his decision
not to recuse himself from Cheney v. U.S. District Court of Columbia,
Justice Scalia dismissed any public concern regarding his potential
impropriety, asserting that those who cannot trust a Supreme Court
Justice should “get a life.”324 Justice Scalia also stated that a rule
requiring members of the Court to remove themselves from cases in
which the official actions of friends were at issue would be crippling. 325
Cheney also raised concerns within the legislature, as several senators
penned a letter to Chief Justice Rehnquist addressing the specifics of the
case and inquiring whether a mechanism was available to the Court to
disqualify a Justice or to review that Justice’s decision not to disqualify
himself.326
A more recent example with respect to the increasing need for the
Court to reexamine its recusal practices arises out of Justice Ginsburg’s
commentary on then-presidential candidate Donald Trump.327 Though
Ginsburg has gained notoriety and support for her oft-outspoken public
comments, some argue that her statements with respect to now-President
Trump could open the door to questioning her impartiality should she be
required to hear a case that involves the President.328 For this reason,
Justices generally avoid making such public comments, as they may be
323. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 914–16 (2004); see
also Liptak, supra note 308.
324. Justice Scalia once remarked, “For Pete’s sake, if you can’t trust your Supreme Court
Justice more than that, get a life.” Joel Roberts, Scalia Proud He Stayed On Cheney Case, CBS
NEWS
(Apr.
12,
2006),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/12/supremecourt/main1493940.shtml (last visited Oct.
2, 2017) (quoting Justice Scalia as stating, “I think the proudest thing I have done on the bench is
not allow myself to be chased off that case”).
325. Michael Janofsky, Scalia Refusing To Take Himself Off Cheney Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
19, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/19/us/scalia-refusing-to-take-himself-off-cheneycase.html; McFarland, supra note 309, at 685.
326. McFarland, supra note 309, at 685; Ross E. Davies, Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables
of Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 79, 86 (2006) (citing a letter from Senators
Patrick Leahy & Joseph I. Lieberman to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Jan. 22, 2004,
reprinted in Irrecusable & Unconfirmable, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 277, 278–79 (2004)).
327. See Adam Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald Trump, Critiques Latest Term,
N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/us/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburgno-fan-of-donald-trump-critiques-latest-term.html?_r=1 (quoting Justice Ginsburg as stating, “I
can’t imagine what this place would be—I can’t imagine what the country would be—with Donald
Trump as our president”).
328. Aaron Blake, In bashing Donald Trump, some say Ruth Bader Ginsburg just crossed a
very important line, WASH. POST (Jul. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/07/11/in-bashing-donald-trump-some-say-ruth-bader-ginsburg-just-crossed-a-veryimportant-line/?utm_term=.0552a16e0bbb.
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required to hear cases involving political issues and figures. 329 Voicing
their unsolicited opinions about such topics could lead to questions of
prejudice and potential recusal from future cases.330 Justice Ginsburg’s
comments would cast doubt on her impartiality in decisions that implicate
President Trump’s policies, as she has expressed that she opposes
President Trump.331 Accordingly, her vote to strike down a Trump
administration policy would be clouded with possible partiality.332
Though the precise holding from Williams does not implicate this type of
personal or political conflict as grounds for recusal, it nevertheless
highlights that the Court will be required to further adjust and expand its
recusal jurisprudence.
Additionally, while the procedural impact of Williams may be narrow,
it may still mitigate public perception of judicial impartiality. Allowing a
judge with prior prosecutorial involvement in a case to preside over the
case on appeal would undermine judicial impartiality, and the majority’s
ruling helps mitigate that possibility. 333 Even a risk of bias could tarnish
the appearance of a fair, independent, and impartial judiciary. 334
The American Bar Association explains that the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct requires judges to promote public confidence in the
judiciary through the continued appearance of fairness in proceedings and
judicial behavior.335 To allow a judge whose office prosecuted a case to
preside over that same case on appeal could potentially destroy the
public’s confidence in the judiciary, which rests on the fairness and
integrity of judges.336 A judge’s prior prosecutorial role could make it
329. Id.
330. Id. Louis Virelli, a Stetson University law professor who wrote a book on Supreme Court
recusals titled Disqualifying the High Court, once noted:
[P]ublic comments like the ones that Justice Ginsburg made could be seen as grounds
for her to recuse herself from cases involving a future Trump administration. I don’t
necessarily think she would be required to do that, and I certainly don’t believe that she
would in every instance, but it could invite challenges to her impartiality based on her
public comments.
Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Re, supra note 298.
334. Brief for American Bar Association, supra note 157, at 2.
335. Id.; see generally American Bar Association, ABA Mission and Goals,
http://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/aba-mission-goals.html; Penn. Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 2 (1974) (requiring judges to avoid the appearance of impropriety and to conduct
themselves in a manner that promotes integrity and impartiality in the judiciary).
336. Brief for American Bar Association, supra note 157, at 11; see also Haluck v. Ricoh
Electronics, Inc., 151 Cal. App. 4th 994, 1008 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that the “source of
judicial authority lies ultimately in the faith of the people that a fair hearing may be had”); see
generally LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 4–5 (1992) (“[T]he
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difficult, if not impossible, for the judge to “hold the balance clear and
true” in reviewing an action he or she took during his or her prior role.337
Thus, asking a judge to neutrally review a case he or she previously
prosecuted calls for the near impossible, as judges would likely try to
justify their prior prosecutorial decisions.338 Because the appearance of
neutrality and objectivity in the judiciary is crucial to maintaining the
public’s trust in the system, every litigant should be entitled to review by
judges whose impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned.339 Thus, the
Court should, as it did in Williams, continue to categorically forbid a
judge from reviewing a determination that he or she was responsible for
as a prosecutor or as the head of an executive department.340
Though the Court’s decision in Williams could impact appellate
judges’ ability to make discretionary recusal determinations, the social
implications of the decision outweigh any potential procedural
difficulties.341 Even the appearance of bias can cause the public to lose
both its respect for and its confidence in the judicial system.342 Thus,
appellate courts and supreme courts must lead by example in setting a
high standard to prevent the appearance of bias.343 To allow the current
danger caused by the appearance of impropriety consists in damaging public confidence in the
judiciary.”).
337. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 6; see Jennifer
K. Robbenolt & Matthew Taskin, Can Judges Determine Their Own Impartiality?, 41 AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION JUDICIAL NOTEBOOK NO. 2, 24 (2010) (asserting that “people
believe they are objective and see themselves as more ethical or fair than others from a subjective
standpoint, but experience a blind spot in that they tend to see bias in others and not in themselves”);
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 121 (2008) (“We use introspection to acquit
ourselves of accusations of bias, while using realistic notions of human behavior to identify bias in
others.”).
338. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 6.
339. Id. at 7–8; Principles of State Appellate Judicial Disqualification, AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF
APPELLATE
LAWYERS
(Apr.
2010),
https://www.appellateacademy.org/publications/policies/recusal_standards.pdf; see also In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[A] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process.”).
340. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 8.
341. See Williams v. Pennsylvania (15-4030), LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/15-5040 (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (concluding that the
Court’s decision “will impact the appellate judge’s ability to make discretionary recusal
determinations, as well as potentially impact the degree of impartiality and objectivity in the
judiciary”).
342. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 8; Principles
of State Appellate Judicial Disqualification, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF APPELLATE LAWYERS (Apr.
2010), https://www.appellateacademy.org/publications/policies/recusal_standards.pdf.
343. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 8. To adjust to
the changing realities of an increasingly complex world, state courts must establish a well-defined
governance structure and provide a uniform message not only to the other branches of government,
but also to the public. Buenger, supra note 217.
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downward trend in public confidence in the judiciary to continue would
destroy the very foundation of American government and promote further
unrest and dissatisfaction.344 Additionally, to allow bias to permeate the
appellate court’s decisionmaking in a singular case could extend the taint
of that bias to every future litigant whose case may be affected by that
decision under stare decisis.345
The appellate courts’ oversight of the trial courts also helps bring
consistency to the greater legal system.346 Unlike the executive branch,
which can formulate and promulgate a single, uniform message, or the
legislative branch, whose adoption of law is ultimately a single message,
the structure of the judiciary as a whole makes it difficult to create
coherent institutional messages.347 Because the majority of state courts
have already adopted a stricter set of standards requiring judicial recusal,
the Court’s decision in Williams reflects the need for a continued message
of uniformity within the judiciary to reinforce public confidence in its
decisionmaking, and ultimately, its institutional credibility.348

344. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 8–9; see also
State v. Allen, 778 N.W.2d 863, 878 (Wis. 2010) (quoting In re Hon. Charles E. Kading, 235
N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1975) (explaining that a lack of confidence in the integrity of the courts “rocks
the very foundations of organized society, promotes unrest and dissatisfaction, and even encourages
revolution”)).
345. Brief of The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 9; see also
Daniel J. Meador, Maruice Rosenberg and Paul D. Carrington, Appellate Courts: Structures,
Functions, Processes, and Personnel xxxi–xxxii (Michie 1994) (explaining that appellate opinions
“collectively form what a trial judge does, even if no appeal is ever taken in a particular case”); see
generally Principles of State Appellate Judicial Disqualification, supra note 339. The decisions of
appellate courts also determine the advice that lawyers give to their clients, the subsequent actions
those clients take based on that advice, and even the content of legal forms that people may use.
Therefore, the precedent established in an opinion deciding a single case may have as much effect
on potential future litigants and on those who depend of the state of the law as it does for the actual
parties to an immediate case at issue. Principles of State Appellate Judicial Disqualification, supra
note 339.
346. See generally Principles of State Appellate Judicial Disqualification, supra note 339
(promoting the adoption of consistent judicial conduct policies); see also Brief of The American
Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 226, at 9 (noting that this oversight must be exercised
without any implication of bias).
347. The structure of many state judicial systems creates fragmented administration and, thus,
fragmented messaging. Increasing competition between state authorities and local authorities can
also work to undermine the institutional standing of courts and portray to the public an appearance
of a fractured and highly disjointed system that fails to maintain organizational coherence.
Additionally, the nature of judicial selection and the selection of important court personnel can
create an individualized environment that challenges the idea of cohesive institutional messaging.
See Buenger, supra note 217. See also Symposium, Working Group 2 Summary, Report on the
Fourth National Symposium on Court Management, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. (Oct. 27, 2010)
(demonstrating that the “messages concerning the interests of the entire judiciary should not be sent
with competing messages”).
348. See generally Buenger, supra note 217 (discussing the need for the American court system
to have a well-defined governance structure).
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CONCLUSION
Williams v. Pennsylvania is a continuation of the Supreme Court’s
current Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, expanding the situations
in which a judge is forced to recuse himself or herself from the bench.
The Court does not ignore the distinction between civil and criminal cases
as related to the single case requirement for recusal, as Justice Thomas
suggests in his dissent. Rather, the rule established in Williams requiring
a judge to step down from the bench in a case in which he or she
previously participated as a prosecutor further demonstrates the Court’s
commitment to preventing even the image of intolerable bias in the
judiciary. Because the judiciary gains its authority from the trust and
confidence of the public, wiping out the appearance of improper
influence and impropriety in the courts is essential. Thus, despite having
only participated in a criminal decision several years prior to overseeing
a related, yet separate, civil proceeding, Chief Justice Castille’s failure to
recuse himself created an impermissible stain of bias on the court and the
case itself.

